Tag: Iraq

  • 2 With Links To ISIS Arrested Over Terror Plans In Klang Valley

    2 With Links To ISIS Arrested Over Terror Plans In Klang Valley

    The police have arrested two Malaysian men suspected to have links with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Isis) militant group.

    The duo had plans to attack several targets in the Klang Valley, Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Khalid Abu Bakar said today.

    He said that the suspects were picked up in two operations in Kuala Lumpur, on July 2 and 7, conducted by the Counter Terrorism Division of the Bukit Aman Special Branch, which also resulted in the seizure of books on jihad (holy war) and the Salafi Jihadi ideology as well as receipts for the purchase of tactical combat items.

    One of the suspects, aged 28 and hailing from Kuala Lumpur, was caught on July 2, he said, adding that he was found to have links with several Europeans who were senior members of the Isis in Syria.

    “Since the middle of last year, two senior European members of Isis had given instructions to the suspect to launch attacks on Western interests in Kuala Lumpur and places of entertainment in the Klang Valley.

    “The suspect, who was exposed to the ideology of the Isis militant group from 2012, had had close links with Ahmad Affendi Manaf, the Malaysian who was killed in a suicide attack in Homs, Syria, on Nov 9 last year,” he said in a statement.

    Khalid said the other suspect, aged 31 and also from Kuala Lumpur, was arrested on July 7. He said the suspect was with Isis in Syria between early and August 2014 before returning to Malaysia after being injured in a clash over there.

    “The two suspects met several times in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor since the end of 2014 to discuss their plot to launch attacks in Malaysia,” he said.

    Khalid said the latest trend of Malaysians planning to launch attacks in the country upon getting instructions from Isis senior members in Syria is most worrying.

    “This is similar to the modus operandi of the latest attacks in Tunisia, France and Kuwait at the end of last month, where individuals sympathetic to and influenced by terrorist ideology or upon getting instructions from Isis senior members in Syria launched attacks,” he said.

    Khalid said the two suspects were caught for offences under Chapter VIA – Offences Relating to Terrorism of the Penal Code (Act 574) and would be investigated under the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (Act 747).

     

    Sources: www.themalaysianinsider.com

  • ISIS Represents Radical Shift In Terrorism

    ISIS Represents Radical Shift In Terrorism

    The world was shocked by the recent brutal attack on tourists on a Tunisian beach. But the story of the killer, and his progression from young football fan to gun-wielding jihadi, is raising alarm in intelligence circles.

    The odd thing about Seifeddine Rezgui, said Mr Fadi Saidi, a computer science student at Tunisia’s Kairouan University, was that he was always one of the least extreme of the radicals. “What changed Seif Rezgui? We don’t know,” said Mr Saidi, who knew the 23-year-old as an undistinguished face among the growing crowd of noisy Salafists, with their literalist interpretation of the Quran, and jihadi sympathisers with whom he and other secularists routinely clashed on campus.

    Rezgui’s rampage on June 26, on a beach near Sousse, left 38 dead in what was the deadliest Islamist terror attack on Europeans since the London subway bombings in 2005.

    More than anything, the bloodshed brought home the reach and power of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in whose name Rezgui murdered. The ability of the group, which controls large swathes of Iraq and Syria, to motivate a breakdancing, football-loving young man to commit mass murder, and in so doing lose his own life, has magnified the threat of what used to be called “lone wolf” terrorism — where individuals take it upon themselves to perpetrate acts of political violence.

    Lone wolf attacks are not new, but the rise of ISIS has changed their nature. The perpetrators are no longer just isolated loners. The pull of the jihadi message that incites them is stronger than ever. Many governments now recognise that the toolkit of counterterrorism developed in fighting Al Qaeda is no longer enough: A major change in approach is required. In the United Kingdom, spymasters are considering the biggest shift in their approach to counterterrorism in a decade.

    “Rezgui was living in this shaabi (poor) neighbourhood called Al Minshiya. It’s massive, maybe almost 100,000 people live there,” said Mr Saidi. “In those kind of areas there are no youth clubs, no cultural activities, no sports. There’s barely even any infrastructure. There’s nothing. All you have is the mosques.”

    Tunisia is riven by the attack. Three months since 21 were gunned down at the Bardo Museum in Tunis, the country’s hard-won reputation as a beacon of stability and democracy following the Arab Spring has been shattered.

    In some ways, it should not come as a surprise. More Tunisians — an estimated 3,000 — have flocked to swell the ranks beneath ISIS’ black banners than any other nationality. In Kairouan, students pull out smartphones to reveal pictures of classmates posing with AK-47s in Syria.

    There is an abundance of reasons given for the turn of so many of Tunisia’s citizens towards jihad. The shaabi neighbourhoods are full of Salafist preachers; crime and drug use are high; the chance of a better future for thousands of young men is not. Hotbeds of Islamism abut glittering tourist resorts. El Sfaya, a ramshackle slum of potholed roads and unadorned concrete block apartments, is a stone’s throw from the beach where Rezgui found his victims.

    Tunisia’s plight is far from unique. Across the Arab world, Europe, North America and elsewhere, counterterror chiefs fret about the new face of terrorism — attacks that do not need direction, do not need plotting and planning, and do not need great resources.

    “After what has happened in Canada, Australia, Denmark and France recently, it seems clear that you don’t need any more to go to Syria to become a terrorist,” said Mr Jacob Rosen, a veteran Israeli diplomat and now senior counsellor at Israel’s Foreign Affairs Ministry.

    “You have a critical mass domestically in so many countries in the Arab world and beyond — you don’t need to travel anywhere to get radicalised.”

    The rise of ISIS has been transformative. Its powerful narrative of redemption has turned the idea of “lone wolf” terrorism into a far more deadly hybrid that motivates a much bigger demographic into action. Under fire from an international coalition in its self-proclaimed caliphate across northern Iraq and Syria, it has sought to export its violence ever further abroad.

    The Sousse attacks came only days after Abu Mohammad Al Adnani, ISIS’ spokesman, exhorted followers to “expose” themselves to martyrdom and bring “disaster to the apostates”.

    NEW TACTICS

    For Western intelligence agencies well-schooled in the fight against Al Qaeda, this shift from hard networks as the vehicles of terror to a movement characterised by charismatic influence is a huge problem. “ISIS’ rise has changed matters a great deal,” said one of Europe’s most senior intelligence officials. “Al Qaeda was about quality. ISIS is about quantity. And we do not have the tools to easily deal with it.”

    Spies across Europe are stretched in dealing with existing networks of hardcore radicals in their own backyards, let alone having now to consider those in other countries. Their investigations have relied on complex processes of triage to whittle down likely suspects to identify the key players at the centre of jihadi groups.

    But as in Tunisia — and the Jewish museum murders in Brussels, the Ottawa Parliament attack, the Charlie Hebdo killings in Paris and the Copenhagen cafe shooting — it is individuals on the periphery of known networks who were the perpetrators. Rezgui, who is said to have trained in Libya for the attack, never featured on the security radar in Tunisia.

    That periphery is not only hard to monitor for legal reasons — warrants for government snooping in much of Europe depend on evidence about who individuals are associating with and why, rather than what they believe — but it is also far larger than the existing groups being monitored. In the UK, for example, the domestic security agency MI5 currently has 3,000 “subjects of interest” on its databases. The agency employs only 5,000 people.

    One senior British counterterrorism official compares it to Brownian motion — the phenomenon of particles in a fluid bouncing around, seemingly at random. “We have to track all of these particles, moving around in ways we cannot necessarily predict … some particles are connected, others are just floating around.”

    According to the EU’s counterterrorism chief, Mr Gilles de Kerchove: “The nature of an organisation is that it is constructed. It leaves traces of links that can be crossed by investigations. But with individuals, they may get their ideas from Dabiq or Inspire (ISIS’ and Al Qaeda’s online magazines, respectively) or the Internet, or their peers … but you do not necessarily know how or when.”

    In response, officials are now focused on trying to develop “counter-narrative” strategies online and in communities to try and disrupt the lure of ISIS’ own story. But such efforts remain piecemeal and are often clunky.

    EXTREMISM’S ALLURE

    In developing policies to eradicate the ISIS narrative, the real key might come in asking why its allure has so suddenly exploded. “We have had a sustained (jihadi) fever. The tensions are so high. The imagery and the rhetoric is like nothing before,” said Mr Patrick Skinner, a former Central Intelligence Agency counterterrorism official and now director of special projects at Soufan Group.

    “The combination of ubiquitous social media and these non-stop conflicts is stoking a very different environment for extremism in Europe and the West … All the conditions are right for this big change in what lone wolf attacks are and mean.”

    ISIS’ skill in information warfare and its use of social media have made a huge difference to the pull of its message. Its physical caliphate itself is, of course, one of the group’s most emotionally resonant concepts. Unlike Al Qaeda, whose leaders led a covert and small network from shadows and caves, ISIS has proclaimed its enduring presence as a physical state. Even the most wilful potential recruits for Al Qaeda struggled to find the network. In the case of ISIS, it is impossible to miss it. As such, for radical young Muslims drawn to extremes, it is much easier to take up the cause.

    Shattering that allure will ultimately require a physical effort as well as a conceptual one, said one senior military official in the anti-ISIS coalition. ISIS needs to suffer defeats to break its primacy in the minds of radicals, he said. In practice, however, the military campaign against ISIS — nearly one year old — has barely contained the group, let alone humiliated it.

    The problem may be yet broader. The slums of Tunisia are not unique as nurseries for crime and producing disillusioned young men and women. The ISIS message has found a home in almost any place where such social structural problems are evident among Muslim communities, be they in London’s East End, Paris’ banlieues or the ethnically segregated villages of the Balkans.

    “We can save people from this,” said Mr Saidi. “But it requires support for civil society and studying the situation to understand the main problems. It isn’t about sending a couple of mukhabarat (spies) into the hotels and mosques.”

    Ironically, the crackdown — which saw dozens of unofficial Tunisian mosques closed in the aftermath of the attack — is in many cases making matters worse. “The harassment is pushing us,” said Mr Waleed, a Salafi truck driver in Tunisia.

    “I was someone who was much more moderate before, but now I am really angry. The only solution is a second revolution — and let it be more than the last one. Let it be like Syria, if it has to be.” THE FINANCIAL TIMES

    ABOUT THE AUTHORS:

    Sam Jones is defence and security editor at The Financial Times and Erika Solomon is the newspaper’s Middle East correspondent.

     

    Source: www.todayonline.com

  • ISIS Video Shows Mass Executions In Syria’s Ruins Of Palmyra

    ISIS Video Shows Mass Executions In Syria’s Ruins Of Palmyra

    BEIRUT (AFP) – The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) group on Saturday released a video showing 25 Syrian government soldiers being executed by teenagers in the ancient amphitheatre in the city of Palmyra.

    The video documented an execution that reportedly happened shortly after the militant group captured the city on May 21.

    It shows the soldiers in green and brown military uniforms being shot dead on the amphitheatre’s stage in front of an enormous version of the group’s black and white flag.

    The executioners all appear to be children or teenagers and are wearing desert camouflage and brown bandanas.

    The killings are carried out in front of a relatively sparse crowd of men and some children watching from the ancient theatre’s seats.

    ISIS reportedly carried out more than 200 executions, including of civilians, in and around Palmyra in the period when it captured the city.

    The executions in the Palmyra amphitheatre were first reported on May 27 by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a Britain-based monitor, less than a week after ISIS captured the city.

    At the time, Syria’s antiquities director Mamoun Abdelkarim said he feared the killings could signal the start of “the group’s barbarism and savagery against the ancient monuments of Palmyra”.

    “Using the Roman theatre to execute people proves that these people are against humanity,” he told AFP.

    The Greco-Roman ruins at Palmyra are listed as a Unesco World Heritage Site, and the city’s capture by ISIS prompted international concerns for the fate of its spectacular ancient treasures.

    So far, ISIS is not reported to have damaged the actual ruins, although it has blown up and desecrated Muslim graves in the city and destroyed a statue outside the Palmyra Museum.

    ISIS has regularly released videos of its mass executions, with slick production and gruesome violence that experts say is a key propaganda tool for the group.

     

    Source: www.straitstimes.com

  • My Journey Inside IS

    My Journey Inside IS

    VICE News produced a world exclusive when filmmaker Medyan Dairieh spent three weeks embedded alone with the Islamic State in June 2014, gaining unprecedented access into the heart of the self-proclaimed caliphate. Here he describes what he learned.

    The two armed men were surprised to see me. No journalists had come this way before. After days of waiting and one failed attempt, I had finally managed to reach the first checkpoint guarding territory controlled by the group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

    By the time I left, about a fortnight later, its ruler, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, had claimed for himself a title which brought with it a new religious and political authority — caliph. The so-called caliphate was declared a year ago, on June 29, while I was there. And from then ISIS became known as the Islamic State (IS).

    While I had been waiting for the signal to cross the border, ISIS had seized Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. Until then, the group was widely perceived to have been on the back foot, having withdrawn in the face of advances from other rebel groups in Syria.

    But its surge into Iraq and the declaration of the “caliphate” re-established the group as a threat, not only to Iraq and Syria but also to the wider Middle East. But who are they? Where did they come from and what do they believe? I wanted to find out.

    Back at the border, the two guards at the checkpoint summoned another, who seemed to have been expecting me. He spoke into his radio: “The guest has arrived, the guest has arrived.”

    Dairieh and a young European fighter who works in the IS media center in Raqqa, Syria. Photo via Medyan Dairieh.

    Abu Jindal al-Iraqi
    It had been nearly 10 years since I first met Abu Jindal al-Iraqi during the Second Battle of Fallujah — six weeks of bloody urban combat at the end of 2004 that pitted Iraqi insurgents, including al Qaeda, against US Marines and their Iraqi and British allies.

    Al-Iraqi was a commander in a makeshift artillery brigade that was fighting against the Americans, but not yet affiliated with al Qaeda. He was a former colonel in Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard, which was disbanded in 2003 in the wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq. He was then clean-shaven and not particularly religious.

    Overnight, thousands of men like al-Iraqi lost their income and their status. Many of them took their military training — and in many cases their weapons — and joined the resistance.

    When I met him again, inside the border in June 2014, he was wearing a full beard and was in every aspect of his appearance a committed Islamist. In the decade since we met, his militia first had merged into the Islamic State in Iraq, al Qaeda’s local franchise, which then went on to found ISIS. He is now a senior IS commander.

    Al-Iraqi’s story is a common one. Internal IS documents obtained by Der Spiegel show not only that the core leadership of the group is made up of former Baathist officers, but that the organization is also run along the lines developed by Iraqi military intelligence.

    A former al Qaeda fighter, who became a member of ISIS, shows off his al Qaeda inscribed gun in Aleppo. Photo by Medyan Dairieh.

    The Birth of IS
    IS’s force is composed of three primary groups: Islamic State in Iraq (based around former Iraqi military men), elements of al Qaeda from the Afghanistan school, and forces from Chechnya and the Caucuses, led by Abu Omar al-Shishani.

    On an earlier visit to Syria, in 2013, I met with Al-Shishani. He was extremely busy and distracted, trying to negotiate between ISIS and the Nusra Front. At that time, tensions were coming to a head.

    Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, then the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, sent one of his most trusted lieutenants, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani to Syria in 2011 as mass protests against the Assad regime spread. His task was to form the Nusra Front, the Syrian affiliate of al Qaeda.

    Al-Jolani and al-Baghdadi later fell out over the direction of the Nusra Front. Al-Baghdadi wanted Nusra to be an extension of the Islamic State in Iraq, and to fall under his command. Al-Jolani wanted to focus on fighting the regime, work with less radical groups, and win hearts and minds. The two men apparently held talks in Aleppo.

    Aleppo in 2012. This was one of the first times that this ISIS badge (on the right) and this flag (associated with the group) were seen in Syria. Photo by Medyan Dairieh.

    Al-Jolani won the support of al Qaeda’s leadership, thought to be based in the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan. I heard that IS tried to send a Libyan member to talk to al Qaeda’s leadership in Afghanistan. The man had difficulties in getting there, however, making me realize that IS’s contacts with al Qaeda leadership were very weak.

    When the split occurred, foreign fighters — including al-Shishani’s Chechens and an experienced group of Libyans fighting as the al-Battar battalion — overwhelmingly pledged their allegiance to IS. Later, when I went to Libya, I met members of the al-Battar battalion who had returned to fight there.

    I believe the muhajireen, as the foreign fighters are known, did not really come to Syria to resist Assad. They came because they saw themselves as soldiers of Islam, and believed it was their religious destiny to build the caliphate.

    Nusra worked with the other rebel groups, participating in joint charity organizations and fighting alongside them. ISIS worked only through its own organizations.

    On 22 February 2014, ISIS assassinated Sheikh Abu Khaled al-Suri, a leader of Ahrar al-Sham, a Salafist militia allied to Nusra. The Nusra Front then declared war on ISIS.

    In the wider Middle East, however, it is IS that has attracted the most new support, including militants from Egypt, Yemen, Libya, not to mention many other parts of the world.

    In Raqqa
    I arrived in Raqqa, the IS capital, shortly after crossing the border. There was a military parade on, which I learned had been timed to coincide with my arrival.

    Before the war, the town was liberal, with a large Christian population. People would go out in the evening to drink and smoke. There’s no music on the street now and even the pictures are covered — it has completely changed.

    There are people from more than 80 nationalities living in Raqqa. Children under 15 go to religious instruction classes. After the age of 16, they go to the military camps for training. After 16 they can join the fighters.

    During my time in Raqqa, I was accompanied at all times by a media team.Although IS has been praised for the quality of their video productions, there are actually very few skilled media workers among them. There were a few who’d worked for TV channels, however, and some foreigners with their own expertise. From what I saw, their equipment was mostly basic and the internet very slow, but they worked long hours, sleeping between three and five hours a night, and keeping a seven-day schedule.

    I learned that support from abroad, especially from Libya, was greatly important in publishing material online. One of the media team also told me that a young woman in the UK had also been helping them with this for a few months.

    They also use more basic means of propaganda, such as publishing texts online, distributing CDs with films, and driving trucks around blaring out speeches by al-Baghdadi and Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, an official IS spokesman.

    IS was initially hostile to international media coverage, but as its members started to notice the world’s huge interest in them, they decided to establish a number of media departments, including most prominently Al-Furqan. They also set up a media office in every province of their “state,” with each department linked to the local preacher’s office.

    Watch the VICE News documentary, The Islamic State here:

    At around 2am on July 4, I awoke to the sound of gunfire and explosions. Those with me from the media department strapped on their explosive belts, grabbed their rifles and rushed out without uttering a word. Everything was dark, as if there was a blackout.

    A few hours later, I learned that US special forces had assaulted a IS camp outside Raqqa. They had apparently hoped to rescue a number of Western hostages who were later killed by IS. The hostages weren’t there, and the troops withdrew empty handed after killing eight IS members — including, I was told, trainee leaders from Tunisia and Saudi Arabia.

    IS also believed that Jordanian troops also took part in the assault and showed me a bloodied scrap of a military uniform bearing Jordanian insignia.

    IS Military Doctrine
    IS has proved adept at fighting and unconventional war, combining tactics from the Taliban, handed down through al-Zarqawi, with the expertise of former Iraqi military officers.

    It has tried to expand the battlefront to exhaust air support, using short-range rockets and missiles, for which officers from the former Iraqi army helped set up inexpensive, hand-made mobile launchers.

    In an attack, the remnants of al Qaeda and suicide groups will be the first troops to mobilize, to strike the advancing forces with suicide operations. The leaders of the former Iraqi Republican Guard will direct other groups to guard their positions and ensure rocket and missile bombing operations are carried out.

    IS has also adopted a three-pronged Taliban military doctrine, Firstly, it strikes the enemy to confuse them, wear them out, and weaken them. Secondly, it obtains supplies such as weapons, money, and food supplies. Thirdly, it claims a media victory to grow the organization’s popularity.

    The success of this approach was evident last summer. In the blink of an eye IS built a state the size of Jordan. It seized large quantities of weapons, including heavy weaponry and all kinds of other sophisticated equipment, and a significant amount of money. IS was able to claim that they broke the 100-year-old Sykes-Picot Agreement, a colonial-era agreement which defined the frontier between Syria and Iraq, by opening up the borders. This gesture sent a message to zealous Islamist youth that IS is leading a global jihad.

    The group does face challenges. They have difficulty obtaining spare parts and supplies to maintain their heavy weapons, and problems manufacturing enough of the car bombs whose en masse deployments have been the prelude to many devastating assaults, including the capture of Ramadi in May. They are forced to fight on multiple fronts: against the Iraqi army, against the Kurds, and against Syrian rebels — as well sometimes against the Syrian regime.

    German and Finnish IS fighters. Photo by Medyan Dairieh.

    But IS realizes it is now engaged now in a crucial battle and not simply sharpening its talons. For this reason, it will try to prolong the battle, and open numerous fronts and lines of fighting in regions that are far from one another. It will do this in order to disperse enemy forces, to be able to attack them far from their reinforcements, and to be able to attack their supply convoys, which are generally on the defensive.

    IS believe it is their destiny to face their most powerful enemy, America, on the field of battle. An IS military commander, an officer from Hussein’s former Republican Guard, told me that IS preparing for an attack, not for defense.

    “We will defend our project,” he said, “and this will only be achieved when America feels the necessity to confront us on the ground — this is what we want and what America fears.”

    Departure
    The time eventually came for me to leave IS territory.

    They took me to a place near the border. Every night we would go to the border, and look out over a dark, empty space. We would wait for the right time to cross, to avoid the army’s patrols.

    We sat, waiting for the all clear. Although they had strong systems to monitor the situation at night, the crossing was nonetheless difficult and dangerous.

    One night, at 2.30am as I was sleeping, they woke me up at told me it was time to cross. I left my big rucksack with them as it was bulky and I couldn’t carry it with me.

    They walked with me and when I asked why they told me that I was their guest and that they would look after my safety, in spite of the danger to themselves, until I reached a safe place on the other side.

     

    Source: https://news.vice.com

  • Singaporean Youth Put On Restriction Order Under ISA After Probe Into Extent Of Radicalisation

    Singaporean Youth Put On Restriction Order Under ISA After Probe Into Extent Of Radicalisation

    A Singaporean youth who was arrested so that investigations could be carried out into the extent of his radicalisation, has been placed on a Restriction Order (RO) under the Internal Security Act (ISA) for two years starting this month .

    The 17-year-old youth, who was arrested last month and was not named, has been released from custody but is required to abide by conditions specified in the RO, the Ministry of Home Affairs said in a statement on Monday.

    The ministry said investigations showed that the youth had become radicalised after viewing videos and materials on websites and social media materials propagated by “radical ideologues and terrorist elements”.

    “He had wanted to engage in armed violence alongside the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and had started making preparations to carry out his plans,” the statement said without elaborating on what these plans were.

    Having been released from custody, the youth is required to abide by a series of conditions.

    He will have to attend religious counselling and must stop accessing violent or extremist online material. He will also not be allowed to leave Singapore without permission or be able to issue public statements.

    The ministry said that the youth’s release on a Restriction Order with conditions attached, “provides a balance between rehabilitation and preserving public security”.

    “Further measures will be taken against him if he breaches the conditions of the RO, or if it is assessed that further measures are needed to protect public security.”

    In April 2015, another youth was detained under the ISA for terrorism-related activities.

    M Arifil Azim Putra Norja’i, 19, had planned to carry out violent attacks in Singapore and to assassinate President Tony Tan and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong if he was unable to go to Syria to join ISIS.

    In its statement on Monday, the ministry reiterated that the community has an important role to play in protecting fellow Singaporeans from radicalisation and terrorism.

    Family members and the public can call the Internal Security Department Counter-Terrorism Centre hotline at 1800-2626-473 should they know of or suspect that someone is radicalised.

    “This could save such individuals and allow them to be helped and counselled, so that they are prevented from engaging in violent activities that may cause harm to themselves and others,” the statement added.

     

    Source: www.straitstimes.com