Tag: ISIS

  • Malaysians In ISIS Trained To Become Snipers And Suicide Bombers

    Malaysians In ISIS Trained To Become Snipers And Suicide Bombers

    KUALA LUMPUR (THE STAR/ASIA NEWS NETWORK) – Malaysians recruited by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terror group in Syria are moving up the ladder in terrorism – they’re leaving their janitorial posts to become snipers and suicide bombers in Iraq.

    Previously cleaners and guards at the camps, Malaysians who fell for the ISIS promise of a false “jihad” are now being trained to become ­snipers and suicide bombers with the specific goal of regaining the group’s grip on Iraq.

    Malaysia’s Special Branch Counter-Terrorism Division head Ayub Khan said the terror group now counted on some Malaysians to carry out its special ops missions all over Iraq.

    “The presence of the ISIS in Syria is quite solid but the group is losing control over Iraq as many territories have fallen back to Iraqi ­government forces.

    “Our intelligence show that they are relying more on Malaysians now to carry out strike missions against several key structures in Iraq,” he told The Star on Wednesday (Sept 30).

    Senior Asst Comm (SAC) Ayub said the Malaysian ­ militants were plucked from the Khatibah Nusantara cell in Syria to join the special ops squads.

    “The Khatibah Nusantara consists of Malaysian and Indonesian ISIS fighters. They band together as their language and interests are similar,” he said.

    This new development came to light following the deaths of three Malaysians in Iraq, believed to be on special ops missions, he said.

    One of them was Zid Saharani Mohamed Esa, 43, who died in a clash with Iraqi forces in Bayji, Iraq, on Aug 29.

    “We believe he was one of the snipers assigned to take out targets at a Iraqi government structure in Bayji.

    “Zid, also known as Abu Hoor, went to Syria in July last year. He went to Bangkok and took a flight to Turkey before securing safe passage to Syria by land.

    “Prior to this, he was involved with Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia and was detained under the ISA (Internal Security Act) in 2002,” he said.

    SAC Ayub said the two others killed were Muhamad Syazani Mohd Salim, 28, and Fadzly Ariff Zainal Ariff, 31.

    Muhamad Syazani, known as Abu Aydan, was also killed in Bayji in a skirmish with Iraqi forces on Sept 18 and was believed to be part of an ISIS infantry trained to fulfil a specific mission objective.

    “He went to Syria on Sept 23 via Istanbul along with his older brother Muhamad Syazwan,” said SAC Ayub.

    Fadzly Ariff Zainal Ariff died on Sept 26 after driving a truck filled with seven tonnes of explosives towards a bridge in Buhayrat, located in Fallujah.

    “The attack also killed a group of Iraqi soldiers.

    “Our intelligence indicates that Fadzly Ariff, known as Abu Ubaidah, had attempted suicide bombings twice but failed as his explosives malfunctioned the previous times,” said SAC Ayub, adding that the former burger seller went to Syria on Oct 11, 2013.

    SAC Ayub said Fadzly Ariff’s mother Azizah Md Yusof was detained under the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act on April 28 last year for giving support to ISIS, and subsequently charged on May 23 the same year.

    The latest deaths bring the number of Malaysians killed in Syria and Iraq to 14.

    “As with some deaths involving Malaysians in both countries, it was hard to get a DNA sample to completely verify and identify the militants involved,” he said, adding that they relied on their intelligence gathering network.

    He said the police had identified 69 Malaysians with ISIS in Syria.

    “Previously, there were militants who joined other terror groups like Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda’s official affiliate in Syria.

    “However, this trend has stopped as all of them have joined ISIS,” he said.

    While the official figure was 69, SAC Ayub said the actual number of Malaysians in Syria could be about 100, including children.

     

    Source: www.thestraitstimes.com

  • 2 Self-Radicalised Singaporeans Detained Under Internal Security Act

    2 Self-Radicalised Singaporeans Detained Under Internal Security Act

    Two self-radicalised Singaporeans have been detained under the Internal Security Act for involvement in terrorism-related activities, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) announced on Wednesday (Sep 30).

    Muhammad Shamin Mohamed Sidek, 29, and Muhammad Harith Jailani, 18, were detained in August this year. Investigations showed that they had harboured the intention to make their way to Syria to join the terrorist group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and engage in violence there, MHA said.

    Shamin was influenced by ISIS’s online radical propaganda and was earlier convicted and sentenced to three months’ jail under Section 267C of the Penal Code for inciting religious violence through his pro-ISIS postings on social media. MHA said he continued to express support for ISIS throughout his three-month imprisonment and was thus arrested under the ISA in July this year to assess if he posed a threat to Singapore’s security.

    Subsequent investigations by the Internal Security Department showed that Shamin planned to travel to Syria to join ISIS once he had raised enough money to fund the trip.

    Shamin had also decided that if he was unable to join ISIS, he would consider fighting alongside a regional militant group that he considered to be aligned with ISIS. “He was undeterred by his arrest under the ISA and said he would pursue his plans to join ISIS after his release from detention. Shamin said he was prepared to die in the course of defending the ‘caliphate’ that was declared by ISIS,” MHA added.

    Like Shamin, 18-year-old Harith was radicalised by online propaganda put up by ISIS. He harboured the intention to carry out armed attacks for the terrorist group, MHA said. “He was prepared to be trained by ISIS to fight and kill the group’s enemies, and to die in the process so that he would receive divine rewards for dying as a martyr.”

    Harith had collected information on how he could travel to Syria and also tried to radicalise those around him to support ISIS’ cause in an attempt to recruit them to join ISIS together with him.

    The detentions of Shamin and Harith underline the “persistent ISIS threat” and the threat posed by self-radicalised Singaporeans, MHA said. The ministry noted that a few of the
    Singaporeans who have been detained had even been prepared to carry out terrorist attacks in Singapore.

    “The Government takes a very serious view of any form of support for terrorism, including but not limited to the use of violence, and will take firm and decisive action against any person who engages in such activities,” the ministry said.

    It encourages those who are aware that someone is involved in terrorism-related activities, or who see suspicious activities to promptly inform the Internal Security Department (1800-2626-473) or call the Police (999).

     

    Source: www.channelnewsasia.com

  • How To Fight ISIS?

    How To Fight ISIS?

    The Islamic State, or ISIS, has captured the world’s attention with gruesome videos of beheadings, wanton destruction of antiquities and skilled use of social media.

    It has also captured a large part of eastern Syria and western Iraq, proclaimed a caliphate based in Raqqa, Syria, and attracted foreign jihadists from around the world.

    United States President Barack Obama said that the Islamic State must be degraded and ultimately defeated. He has appointed General John Allen to lead a coalition of about 60 countries in the task, relying on air strikes, special forces and training missions.

    Some critics want him to send more American troops; others say that the US should settle for a doctrine of containment.

    In the current US presidential campaign, some candidates are calling for “boots on the ground”. They are right: Boots are needed.

    But the soldiers who wear them should be Sunni Arabs and Turks, not Americans. And that says a lot about the nature of the triple threat that the US and its allies now face.

    The Islamic State is three things: A transnational terrorist group, a proto-state and a political ideology with religious roots.

    It grew out of Al Qaeda after the misguided US-led invasion of Iraq; like Al Qaeda, it appeals to extremist Sunni Islamists.

    But it has gone further, by trying to establish a caliphate, and is now a rival to Al Qaeda.

    Its possession of territory creates the legitimacy and capacity for offensive jihad, which it wages not only against infidels, but also Shia and Sufi Muslims, whom it considers “takfir”, or not true Islamic monotheists.

    The Islamic State extols the purity of seventh-century Islam, but it is extremely adept at using 21st-century media.

    Its videos and social-media channels are effective tools for attracting a minority of Muslims — primarily young people from Europe, America, Africa and Asia — who are struggling with their identity. Disgruntled, many are drawn to “Sheikh Google”, where Islamic State recruiters wait to prey upon them.

    By some estimates, there are more than 25,000 foreign fighters serving in the Islamic State today. Those who are killed are quickly replaced.

    SUNNI MUSLIM SOLDIERS TO COMBAT ISIS

    The tripartite nature of the Islamic State creates a policy dilemma. On the one hand, it is important to use hard military power to deprive the caliphate of the territory that provides it both sanctuary and legitimacy. But if the American military footprint is too heavy, the Islamic State’s soft power will be strengthened, thus aiding its global recruiting efforts.

    That is why the boots on the ground must be Sunni. The presence of foreign or Shia troops reinforces the Islamic State’s claim of being surrounded and challenged by infidels.

    So far, thanks largely to effective Kurdish forces, who are overwhelmingly Sunni, the Islamic State has lost about 30 per cent of the territory it held a year ago.

    But deploying additional Sunni infantry requires training, support and time, as well as pressure on Iraq’s Shia-dominated central government to temper its sectarian approach.

    After the debacle in Libya (where the Islamic State supports jihadist militias and has announced the creation of three “distant provinces”), Mr Obama is understandably reluctant to overthrow Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime, only to see the Islamic State take control of more territory, accompanied by genocidal atrocities against Syria’s many non-Sunnis.

    But Mr Assad is one of the Islamic State’s most effective recruiting tools. Many foreign jihadists respond to the prospect of helping to overthrow a tyrannical Alawite ruler who is killing Sunnis.

    The US diplomatic task is to persuade Mr Assad’s supporters, Russia and Iran, to remove him without dismantling the remains of the Syrian state structure. A no-fly zone and a safe zone in northern Syria for the millions of displaced people could reinforce American diplomacy. And providing massive humanitarian assistance to the refugees (at which the American military is very effective) would increase US soft power enormously.

    As it stands, the funding and coordination of America’s soft-power strategy is inadequate. But we know that hard power is not enough, particularly to contest the cyber territory that the Islamic State occupies — for example, by developing a capacity to take down botnets and counter hostile social-media accounts.

    Even if the US and its allies defeat the Islamic State over the coming decade, we should be prepared for a similar Sunni extremist group to rise from the ashes.

    Revolutions of the type the Middle East is experiencing take a long time to resolve. The sources of revolutionary instability include tenuous post-colonial boundaries; arrested modernisation; the failed Arab Spring; and religious sectarianism, exacerbated by the interstate rivalry between Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia and Shia-ruled Iran.

    In Europe, wars of religion between Catholics and Protestants lasted for nearly a century and a half. The fighting ended (with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648) only after Germany lost a quarter of its population in the Thirty Years’ War.

    But it is also worth remembering that the coalitions of that time were complex, with Catholic France aiding Dutch Protestants against Catholic Habsburgs for dynastic rather than religious reasons. We should expect similar complexity in today’s Middle East.

    Looking ahead in a region where the US has interests as varied as energy, Israel’s security, nuclear non-proliferation and human rights, American policymakers will need to follow a flexible strategy of “containment plus nudging”, which implies siding with different states and groups in different circumstances.

    For example, whether or not Iranian policy becomes more moderate, sometimes Iran will share US interests, and sometimes it will oppose them. In fact, the recent nuclear agreement may open opportunities for greater flexibility.

    To seize them, however, US foreign policy towards the Middle East will have to develop a higher level of sophistication than the current debate reveals.

    ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

    Joseph Nye is a professor at Harvard University and the author of Is the American Century Over?, recently co-chaired an Aspen Strategy Group discussion on the Islamic State and radicalism in the Middle East.

     

    Source: www.todayonline.com

  • Kepala Komandan IS Dipenggal Kerana Sering Goda Isteri Orang Bawahan

    Kepala Komandan IS Dipenggal Kerana Sering Goda Isteri Orang Bawahan

    KUALA LUMPUR: Akibat sering mengganggu isteri kepada anggota bawahan, seorang ketua atau komandan militan Negara Islam (IS) telah dipenggal kepalanya.

    Anggota kumpulan militan tersebut bagaimanapun kini berada dalam pelarian kerana bimbang diambil tindakan oleh penyokong-penyokong tegar ketuanya.

    Kejadian yang dilaporkan Iraqi News itu berlaku di Sharqat, Salah al-Din yang terletak di utara Baghdad dan memetik memetik sumber yang enggan didedahkan identitinya.

    Menurut ceritanya, anggota IS yang berusia 28 tahun dan berasal dari Iraq itu mengetahui bahawa isterinya sering digoda komandan tersebut setiap kali dia meninggalkan kediaman untuk bertempur di medan perang.

    Beberapa hari lalu sejurus pulang, dia nekad berdepan dengan ketuanya itu untuk bertanyakan tentang masalah tersebut. Pertemuan itu tidak berakhir dengan baik apabila kepala ketuanya telah dipenggal.

    Berikutan kejadian mengejutkan itu, pihak IS telah mengeluarkan perintah untuk menangkap lelaki berkenaan, sama ada hidup atau mati, dan dibawa kembali ke markas IS di Sharqat.

    Sharqat merupakan kubu kuat IS di wilayah Salah-al-Din sejak berjaya ditakluk pada Jun 2014.

    Sementara itu, nasib isteri anggota IS berkenaan tidak diketahui. Secara umumnya, walaupun golongan wanita tidak dilayan dengan baik dalam IS, masih ramai wanita dari negara luar yang tertarik untuk menyertai kumpulan militan itu.

     

    Source: www.astroawani.com

  • What Drives People To Join Extremist Groups?

    What Drives People To Join Extremist Groups?

    Militant groups such as the Islamic State (IS) can offer direction and a certain meaning in life that some people crave, said Professor Andrew Silke from the University of East London, where he is programme director for Terrorism Studies. Prof Silke, who serves as a counterterrorism consultant to government agencies in Britain and America, is in Singapore to give a lecture at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies. In this interview with TODAY, he examines the appeal of IS and suggests ways to deal with returning fighters.

    What is the draw of the Islamic State? In particular, why does it appeal to young people even from developed countries?

    The appeal is based on a range of factors. For some, it is a sense of adventure and excitement. For others, it provides a strong sense of identity and belonging. To the people attracted, IS can offer a powerful sense that you are doing something meaningful and that you matter. The reality, of course, when people get there can be much harsher and very different. But for young people looking for meaning and direction in their lives, IS can appear to offer answers and certainty.

    There have been many instances of young women in their teens being radicalised by the Islamic State and travelling to the conflict areas for marriage. What drives them?

    The Islamic State offers clarity, certainty and a clear sense of belonging and meaning. That can be very, very attractive to young people, who are often searching for a clear sense of identity and a quest for significance and acceptance. In its propaganda, IS offers all these and more.

    What is the typical psychological state of a jihadist who has returned after fighting? Is it euphoria and a sense of accomplishment or emptiness as the “mission” has ended?

    Most are tired and have no intention of trying to continue the conflict elsewhere. Probably fewer than 10 per cent have a serious interest in further violence. Some are disillusioned by their experiences. The conflict was not the noble, heroic adventure they expected. The group they were fighting for also failed to live up to expectations. Some suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and other problems as a result of what they have seen or done. Many are anxious about their future and what will happen if they are identified by the authorities as a returning fighter.

    How should countries rehabilitate jihadist returnees? How do we strike a balance between the carrot (counselling, making them feel less marginalised) and the stick (stronger legislation to “punish” them)?

    This is a very tough question and one that the United Kingdom, for example, is really struggling with today. About 600 UK citizens have travelled to fight with the Islamic State. Many have already returned and some of those have been imprisoned. Others have tried to travel and have been stopped and imprisoned too.

    I think we need a balanced approach. We should offer a route out for people who have changed their minds and are desperate to leave IS. Some people remain in Syria mainly because they think they will be imprisoned if they try to return home. There are disengagement and counter-radicalisation programmes these people can do which can help them leave without having to face years in prison. But we also need to recognise that there will be highly radicalised individuals who are extremely committed to the IS cause, and prison is a legitimate and sensible option for them.

    From the macro policy perspective, what are the most vital measures governments should take to prevent the radicalisation of individuals?

    First, I think we need to accept that you cannot have a society that is completely free of extremism and if your focus is to try to eliminate all extremism, you are setting yourself up for failure. Only totalitarian regimes can have such ambitions and who would want to live in that type of society?

    Second, we need to be careful about claiming radicalisation is the result of one factor. The UK government, for example, is pushing the view that extreme ideology is the primary cause of radicalisation. It is convenient to blame ideology because the role of other factors such as discrimination, marginalisation and foreign policy get pushed to the side.

    The counterterrorism effort starts to focus increasingly on only countering the ideology and expecting that that will be the solution.

    Research shows us that a range of factors drives radicalisation and that identity issues, for example, are more important than ideology in explaining how and why young people become radicalised.

     

    Source: www.todayonline.com