Category: Politik

Indonesia kutuk Singapura Sebagai Negeri Tak Tahu Diri

Jakarta – “Der mensch ist, war es iszt’” kata pepatah Jerman. Sikap manusia sepadan dengan caranya mencari makan. Berkaca kepada Singapura, pepatah itu benar adanya.

Dengarlah ancaman yang dikoarkan Menteri Pertahanan Singapura, Ng Eng Hen. Di hadapan parlemen Singapura yang langsung dilansir stasiun berita Channel News Asia, pada Selasa (18/2/2014) Ng melarang KRI Usman Harun melintasi perairan negeri itu. Tidak hanya itu, angkatan bersenjata Singapura (SAF) juga dilarang berlatih militer dengan kapal perang milik Indonesia itu.

“Kapal itu akan membawa kembali memori menyakitkan dan kelam bagi keluarga korban,” kata Ng, menjadikannya alasan.

Tak cukup hanya mengancam, Ng juga menyindir sikap Indonesia yang memberi nama kapal itu dengan asma dua prajurit Marinir yang sempat memporandakan Singapura di masa perjuangan Indonesia untuk mengganyang Malaysia itu. “…ketika RI dilanda bencana tsunami tahun 2004 di Aceh, SAF merupakan tim pertama yang memberikan bantuan kepada Indonesia,” kata Ng. Seolah dengan kalimat itu Ng menyatakan sikap tahu diri dan tahu membalas budi adalah watak yang alpa dari bangsa Indonesia.

Ng lupa, bangsanya sungguh lebih buruk dari apa yang ia sindirkan. Bertahun-tahun Negeri Singa itu menjadi surga para koruptor dan penjahat penggangsir dana rakyat Indonesia yang lari ke sana. Bertahun-tahun Singapura berkelit dan tak mau menyerahkan para pencoleng itu kepada aparat hukum Indonesia dengan alasan tidak adanya perjanjian ekstradisi di antara kedua negara. Bertahun-tahun pula Singapura menikmati tetesan dana haram itu untuk menggemukkan kantong pemasukan negaranya. Manakala pada 2007 negara itu bersetuju dalam perjanjian ekstradisi, hingga kini negara itu belum juga meratifikasi.

Jangan lupa, berdasarkan tulisan Michael Backman di The Age, pada 2006 saja dana-dana kotor dari Indonesia itu mencapai proporsi 22 persen perekonomian Singapura.

Lalu soal tak tahu diri, Ng pun sebaiknya berkata sambil berkaca. Agar perkataan itu berdengung keras di telinganya sendiri. Bukan Indonesia yang sering melanggar batas wilayah. Justru negeri upil itu yang tercatat sering masuk ranah tetangga tanpa salam sebelumnya.

Belum lagi soal upaya negeri itu terus memperluas wilayah dengan modal pasir-pasir laut yang dikeruk dari perairan Indonesia. Padahal, penggalian pasir itu sendiri merusak lingkungan alam Indonesia. Kementerian Luar Negeri pada 2006 menyatakan, reklamasi yang dilakukan pemerintah Singapura sudah menyebabkan daratan Singapura maju sejauh 12 kilometer dari original base line perjanjian perbatasan Indonesia-Singapura pada 1973. Tentu saja, itu memengaruhi wilayah Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif Indonesia.

Terakhir, pada 7 Februari lalu dua pesawat tempur Singapura– diperkirakan jenis F-16, melintas langit Batam. Pesawat berwarna abu-abu kehitaman itu terbang rendah di langit Sekupang, Batam, dengan suara menyakitkan telinga warga.

Lihatlah, seolah berdiri di ujung jurang, kepada dirinya sendiri kata-kata Ng bergaung. Singapura, benar-benar mengingatkan kita akan figur serakah, pongah namun tak punya marwah. Der mensch ist, war es iszt.

Namun jangan lupa, ada teladan dalam kata-kata Ng. Ng seorang yang sangat nasionalis. Sayang, nasionalisme Ng adalah nasionalisme sempit yang membuat hati penyair Rabindranath Tagore kebat-kebit. “…bangsa-bangsa yang saling ketakutan, intai mengintai seperti hewan buas di malam hari,” kata Tagore, saat ia mengunjungi Jepang yang tengah memnyiapkan perang di 1916.

Sayangnya, nasionalisme itulah yang kini nyaris padam dalam kehidupan bernegara kita. Mungkin juga dari dada para pejabat kita; paling tidak melihat ketidakberanian akut yang menghantui mereka. Padahal, seperti kata pendiri bangsa, Mohamad Hatta, jatuh bangunnya negara ini, sangat tergantung dari bangsa ini sendiri. “Makin pudar persatuan dan kepedulian, Indonesia hanyalah sekedar nama dan gambar seuntaian pulau di peta.”

Darmawan Sepriyossa

Sumber: INILAHCOM

February 19, 2014
When terrorists in one country are national heroes in another

Tensions are running high between Indonesia and Singapore over the former’s decision to name a naval vessel after two convicted members of the Indonesian Marine Corps, who carried out the bombing of the MacDonald House office building in Singapore on March 10, 1965.

The bone of contention lies in how Harun Said and Usman Ali, the two Indonesian commandos, are seen by both countries.

In Singapore, they are the perpetrators of the bombing of a civilian target, while the Indonesian government sees them as national heroes who carried out their duty during Konfrontasi (1963-66) with Malaysia.

The disparate labels for the two men are understandable considering Singapore, still part of Malaysia at the time, and Indonesia were locked in a dispute that stemmed from the latter’s objection towards the formation of the federal state of Malaysia, encompassing large swathes of territory on the island of Borneo that Indonesia had laid claim to.

However, objectively speaking, were Usman and Harun terrorists or were they war heroes?

Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines terrorism as the use of violent acts to frighten the people in an area as a way of trying to achieve a political goal. By this definition alone, what the two men did qualifies as an act of terrorism.

Singaporean police records state that when they were arrested floating at sea, the two men said they were a fisherman and a farmer, before later confessing to the bombing.

However, it was not until later, during their trial for murder, that the two revealed they were members of the Indonesian Marine Corps with express orders to cause trouble in Singapore as part of confrontation with Malaysia. Apparently, the two men chose to reveal their status in the hope of being treated as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions.

When the presiding judge denied them POW status – on the grounds that members of enemy armed forces who are combatants and who come here with the assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits and divest themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers, but are captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war – Usman and Harun retracted their statements that they were members of the Indonesian military.

Despite lobbying by the Jakarta government for their release, Usman and Harun were found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. However, when their bodies were brought back to Jakarta after their execution in 1968, the two were interred in the National Heroes Cemetery with full military honours.

It could well be argued that the granting of national hero status to the two men was Indonesia’s way of saving face after a failed diplomatic attempt to have the two released.

It was also a delicate time for Indonesia as the new government under then President Sukarno was trying to extricate itself from the confrontation.

The hero status for both men was also anomalous even by Indonesian standards, as people given this recognition are usually those who perished in combat against enemy forces. Usman and Harun never actually met these criteria – as never during Konfrontasi did the Indonesian government nor its Malaysian counterpart officially declare war on each other.

So, essentially, both were perpetrators of a state-sponsored act of terrorism. Hence, the adamant position by the Singaporean government that Usman and Harun were terrorists.

By the same token, Indonesians should look at the incident as a lesson in how not to conduct bilateral relations. Sukarno’s accusation that Malaysia was a puppet state of the United Kingdom has never been proven.

To date, it remains obscure why Sukarno instigated the unofficial war against Malaysia in 1963. Some historians have argued that his earlier success in wresting Papua from the Dutch emboldened him to try a similar tactic with the former British Malaya, though Sukarno always publicly denied any territorial ambitions. Nevertheless, Sukarno’s coveting Malaysia as part of a Greater Indonesia may not have been just a flight of fancy.

In many ways, his model for the state of Indonesia was the ancient Majapahit Empire, which encompassed Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and parts of Thailand and Indochina.

Whatever his motives, the border skirmishes and acts of sabotage against Malaysia during Konfrontasi appeared to be designed to provoke the British, who had granted independence to Malaysia in 1957, into declaring war against Indonesia. Had they done so, Sukarno would certainly have obtained his evidence that Malaysia was simply an extension of British imperial powers.

Johannes Nugroho*

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*Johannes Nugroho is a writer and businessman from Surabaya. This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of The Malaysian Insider.

Source: The Jakarta Globe

February 19, 2014
‘Kalau Perang Lawan Singapura atau Amerika, Indonesia Cuma Boleh Bertahan 4 Hari’

Jakarta -Ketahanan energi Indonesia sangat rapuh, selain tidak punya cadangan Bahan Bakar Minyak (BBM), stok minyak mentah hanya cukup 4 hari, stok operasional hanya 21 hari. Bila Indonesia perang, Indonesia hanya mampu bertahan 4 hari saja.

“Ketahanan energi Indonesia dibilang rapuh memang iya, kita pernah rapat di Kemenko (Kementerian Koordinator), kalau kita perang misalnya lawan Singapura atau Amerika Serikat, pertahanan kita hanya mampu bertahan 4 hari saja,” ungkap Direktur Pembinaan Hulu Migas, Direktorat Jenderal Migas Kementerian ESDM Naryanto Wagimin, di acara Forum Energi: “Masa Depan & Tantangan Industri Migas Nasional”, di Hotel Four Seasons, Kuningan, Jakarta, Selasa (18/2/2014).

Naryanto mengungkapkan, Singapura sudah membuat komitmen dengan Amerika Serikat (AS) untuk menjadi terminal BBM di Asia Tenggara.

“Singapura mempunyai storage (stok) minyak dan BBM sangat besar sekali, mereka akan menjadi terminal terbesar di Asia Tenggara. Kita ingin bangun storage, memang harusnya dibangun oleh negara, tapi pendanaannya tentu tidak mudah. Kita mau bangun kilang minyak saja diskusinya sangat panjang, uangnya dari mana, namun ujung-ujungnya diberikan ke pihak swasta,” ujarnya.

Tidak bisa dipungkiri, Indonesia saat ini sangat bergantung kepada pasokan BBM dari Singapura.

“Kita impor BBM tetap dari Singapura, minyak mentah impornya lewat dari Singapura, kalau elpiji memang masih dari Timur Tengah. Singapura memiliki kilang minyak kapasitasnya hampir 1,5 miliar barel,” katanya.

Seperti diketahui, stok minyak Indonesia saat ini hanya ada 9 juta barel, namun yang dapat diangkut hanya 3 juta barel, 3 juta barel tersebut hanya cukup kurang dari 3-4 hari, Indonesia juga tidak memiliki stok BBM seliter pun. Sementara Indonesia hanya punya stok cadangan operasional BBM selama 21 hari yang tersebar di depo BBM dan SPBU di seluruh Indonesia.

Sumber: DetikNews

February 18, 2014
Singapore and Indonesia: An Uneasy Coexistence?

The latest tensions to emerge between Singapore and Indonesia—this time after Indonesia named a naval warship for two marines executed for a 1965 bombing in Singapore—caught many political observers by surprise. Relations in recent years had remained cordial despite several noteworthy incidents, such as the transboundary haze caused by Indonesian forest fires (for which Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono memorably apologized), and Singapore’s sand reclamation works on Indonesian islands. The political fallout from both incidents seemed to have been contained by both sides.

Yet in the recent days following Indonesia’s decision to name its new frigate the KRI Usman Harun, no fewer than five Singaporean ministers have spoken up against Indonesia’s actions, with the latest development being Indonesian defense officials pulling out of the Singapore Airshow (according to some reports, after Singapore canceled invites to junior officials).

As with many other political events, the role of discourse has been central to the development of these tensions. Underlying these discursive tensions are structural factors that have made this conflict to be particularly intractable. However, structure and discourse have often become intertwined.

Size Matters

The structural disparities between Indonesia and Singapore have surfaced from time to time, most symbolically in for Indonesian President B. J. Habibie’s dismissal of Singapore as “a red dot” in 1998, which struck a raw nerve among Singapore policymakers at the time. They later deftly turned it into a synonym for Singapore’s success, as evidenced by books such as The Little Red Dot: Reflections of Singapore’s Diplomats, which paid tribute to the success of Singaporean diplomacy in helping the country punch above its weight.

But size could also be a reason for the failure to resolve conflicts between Singapore and Indonesia. Size, in this sense, can be interpreted literally as well as symbolically, as the self-images of both countries. Both the original conflict in 1968 as well as the current one in 2014 have been directly attributed to size. When then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew turned down a direct appeal by former President Soeharto to pardon the two Indonesian marines, in the words of former MFA Permanent Secretary Bilahari Kausikan, “he could not have done otherwise without conceding that the small must always defer to the big and irretrievably compromising our sovereignty.”

However, if Singaporeans are adamant that the small must not defer to the big, then the Indonesians are equally adamant that the big must not defer to the small. A few days ago, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Djoko Suyanto declared that “the fact that there is a different perception of Indonesian government policy by other countries, in this instance, Singapore, cannot make us backtrack or be uncertain about carrying on with our policy decision and implementing it.” Golkar MP Hajriyanto Thohari, deputy chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly, went one step further, declaring “Let Singapore keep shrieking, like a chicken beaten by a stick.”

Discourses Matter

The Singapore-Indonesia dispute could have just been like any other in the region—and there is no shortage of them—with patriotic populations echoing the nationalist rhetoric of their political leaders. Yet what is particularly striking in this case is the disconnect between “official” and “popular” discourses. While politicians have tried to drum up support for their respective positions through the mass media, this has had limited resonance with Singaporeans and Indonesians, who regard each other as “friends” to the extent of questioning state discourses portraying the unreasonableness of the other side.

The mix of voices on both sides is evidence that nationalist narratives, while dominant, are balanced with a good dose of self-reflection among the general public in both countries. On February 8, the Jakarta Postpublished an editorial titled “Can we be more sensitive?” while on the same day, Singaporean playwright Alfian Sa’at argued that Singapore’s denial of clemency to the two Marines could have led to their “martyrdom,” setting off a chain of events that led to the current dispute. It is not the purpose of this essay to evaluate the veracity of these counter-narratives, but simply to point out that their existence is evidence of pluralism within both Indonesian and Singapore societies. This desire to understand the other’s perspective, despite state appeals to patriotism and nationalism, augurs well for the relationship between both countries, at least on a people-to-people level.

ASEAN Centrality

This article has argued that an asymmetry in size has formed the basis of the security dilemma that exists between Singapore and Indonesia, leading to a diplomatic impasse between the two countries. It has also shown, however, that a gap exists between official and popular discourses. With the exception of families affected by the 1965 bombing, the events of Konfrontasi, which took place half a century ago, have little resonance for Singaporeans and Indonesians who have the good fortune of living in an era of peace, one that both their countries have played a central role in creating, as founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Indeed, both Indonesia and Singapore continue to play very important roles in ASEAN. Indonesia had an active role in mediating between Thailand and Cambodia during the Preah Vihear conflict, through a process of “shuttle diplomacy” that was the work of Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa. Singapore, too, was instrumental in the setting up of many ASEAN-related initiatives, most notably the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting, and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).

Given the centrality of both Indonesia and Singapore to ASEAN, it is unfortunate that an error in judgment on the part of the Indonesian Navy has led to a diplomatic impasse from which neither the bigger nor the smaller state can extricate itself easily and gracefully—a timely reminder of ASEAN’s yet-unrealized dream of becoming a “security community.” Yet it is time for Indonesia and Singapore to set aside their historical grievances, painful as these may be, and concentrate on the areas in which further cooperation may be achieved, thereby sustaining their shared vision of creating a true ASEAN Community.

By Yvonne Guo

The author is a PhD candidate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

Source: The Diplomat

February 16, 2014
Bilahari Kausikan: Sensitivity is a two-way street

INDONESIAN Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has told the Singapore media that “no ill intent was meant, no malice, no unfriendly outlook”, when Indonesia named a new frigate KRI Usman Harun, after two Indonesian marines executed in 1968 for a 1965 terror attack on MacDonald House in Orchard Road that killed three and injured 33.

Singaporeans will no doubt be happy to know this. But I am afraid that the Foreign Minister entirely missed the point.

The issue is not Indonesia’s intentions. It is something far more fundamental. Indonesians never tire of reminding Singapore that we should be “sensitive” and “neighbourly”. But Indonesians do not seem to believe that they should be equally “sensitive” to their neighbours. “Sensitivity” and “neighbourliness” are to them a one-way street.

These are the facts: Between 1963 and 1966, then Indonesian President Sukarno waged a “Konfrontasi” (confrontation) of terror attacks and military action to “Ganjang (crush) Malaysia”. Singapore was part of the Federation of Malaysia formed in September 1963 until August 1965 when it became independent.

In Singapore alone, there were some 40 bomb attacks over about two years. Most of the targets could by no stretch of the imagination be considered legitimate military objectives. They included schools, hotels, cinemas, bus depots, telephone booths and residences.

MacDonald House was an office building. The victims of that bombing were civilian office workers. Relatives of the victims are still alive. Older Singaporeans still remember the fear and uncertainty of that period. Are we not entitled to some “sensitivity”?

The two who planted the bomb, Osman Mohamed Ali and Harun Said, may have been Indonesian marines, but were in civilian clothes and sneaked into Singapore for terror attacks against civilians. They were found guilty of murder and executed after they had exhausted all legal appeals.

What would Indonesians think if the Singapore Navy were to go crazy and name one of its warships after Noordin Top, the terrorist behind bombings in Jakarta in 2004 and 2009 and who may have assisted in the 2002 Bali bombings?

The late President Suharto sent a personal emissary to plead for clemency for the two marines. But they had been convicted of murder after due legal process. On what grounds could Singapore have pardoned them?

To have done so would have been to concede that the small must always defer to the big and irretrievably compromise our sovereignty.

After Singapore refused the clemency appeals, a Jakarta mob then sacked our embassy, burned our flag and threatened to kill our ambassador.

There were actually four Indonesians on death row in Singapore in 1968 for crimes committed during Konfrontasi. Two others, Stanislaus Krofan and Andres Andea, had their sentences remitted after pleas by the Indonesian government and were sent back to Indonesia. The bomb they planted did not kill anyone.

A few years later in 1973, Singapore’s then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew placed flowers on the graves of the two executed marines, thus bringing the episode to a close.

Both actions – standing firm on fundamental principle even at the risk of conflict and making a gracious gesture once the principle had been established – were equally important in setting the foundations of the relationship Singapore today enjoys with Indonesia.

The origins of Konfrontasi are complex: the political tensions and contradictions within Indonesian society of that time, Sukarno’s fiery personality and grandiose ambitions for “Indonesia Raya” (greater Indonesia), among other things.

Self-righteous nationalism

THESE conditions are not likely to be repeated. But as the respected American scholar of Indonesia, the late Dr George McTurnan Kahin, wrote in 1964 while Konfrontasi was still ongoing, that episode of aggression towards its neighbours was the consequence of the “powerful, self-righteous thrust of Indonesian nationalism” and the widespread belief that “because of (the) country’s size… it has a moral right to leadership”.

Time may have given a more sophisticated gloss to this attitude but has not essentially changed it.

This attitude lies, for example, behind the outrageous comments by some Indonesian ministers during the haze last year that Singapore should be grateful for the oxygen Indonesia provides; it is the reason why Indonesians think Singaporeans should take into account their interests and sensitivities without thinking it necessary to reciprocate.

Indonesians and Singaporeans need to understand this.

Of course, Indonesia has the right to name its ship anything it pleases, as some Indonesians have argued. But that is beside the point.

Why choose a name that is bound to cause offence? That the Indonesians did not even think of the implications, as Foreign Minister Marty’s comments to the media would suggest, is exactly the point.

I do not expect the Indonesians to change the name of the ship. But would any Indonesian leader be prepared to emulate Mr Lee Kuan Yew and place a wreath at MacDonald House?

It was not Singapore that started this incident. And Singapore has no interest in seeing relations with a close neighbour strained.

But Singaporeans cannot let this episode pass without signalling our displeasure.

The foundations laid for the bilateral relationship in 1968 and 1973 are still valid. Mutual respect is the essential condition for good relations.

My father was ambassador to Indonesia when Singapore’s embassy was sacked. He was on leave in Singapore when the decision was taken to turn down the appeal for clemency. He went back to Jakarta to be at post when the execution took place.

After the mob attacked our embassy, he and all our staff remained at post, operating from Hotel Indonesia.

I was a schoolboy studying in Singapore at that time. But shortly after the attack, he summoned me to Jakarta to join him and my mother. I now realise that it was to show that we were not intimidated. It was my first lesson in diplomacy.

I spent a boring month holed up in Hotel Indonesia.

The only “entertainment” was the daily demonstrations in the square in front of the hotel, which included a seemingly endless stream of red-bereted KKO (Navy Commando Corps) commandos marching by, shouting threatening slogans.

But after a while, I realised that it was only a few units marching round and round in circles because I came to recognise the faces of individual soldiers. And that too is a lesson that Singaporeans should understand.

February 13, 2014