Category: Sosial

  • Pritam Singh  – A Response To Bilahari Kausikan On The Issue Of Opposition Parties And Foreign Policy

    Pritam Singh – A Response To Bilahari Kausikan On The Issue Of Opposition Parties And Foreign Policy

    Former Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs Mr Bilahari Kausikan’s remarks at the fifth and final lecture of his IPS-Nathan Lecture Series titled Dealing with an Ambiguous World: Can Singapore Cope? revisited an intractable pessimism and lack of confidence about the approach of the opposition in Singapore – specifically the Workers’ Party – towards foreign policy in Singapore.

    This opinion was apparently formed on the basis of a parliamentary question I asked the then Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2013, on Singapore’s decision to abstain on the successfully passed United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution to elevate Palestine’s status at the UN to that of a non-member observer.

    I say Mr Kausikan’s views on the matter are intractable because this is the second time the very same point he makes has been carried by the Straits Times, although it is the first time he refers to me by name.[1] In fact, Mr Kausikan, has consistently made the identical point, originally found in an endnote of his contribution to a book published by Straits Times Press in 2015 titled The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew.[2]

    I will use the rest of this article to address Mr Kausikan’s misgivings, by putting my views on the drivers of my parliamentary question on Palestine in perspective. In doing so, I will identify the shortcomings and partisan nature of Mr Kausikan’s point about the Workers’ Party approach towards foreign policy, which he anchors on the basis of one parliamentary question, albeit recycled three times across three different contributions authored by him.

    Before doing so, it would only be appropriate for me to acknowledge Mr Kausikan for his reflections on a broad canvas of topical issues on global affairs as the second speaker of the IPS-Nathan lecture series. They reveal a personality with an acute sense of Singapore’s interests and the trade-offs that determined Singapore’s foreign policies priorities in years past and present. I personally found his reflections on the management of a rising China in the years to come and importance of avoiding invidious choices, insightful.

    In making his point that the Workers’ Party plays “fast and loose with foreign policy for partisan purposes”, Mr Kausikan posed three rhetorical questions. Firstly, if the Arab countries did not think Singapore’s relations with Israel and our position on Palestine were problems, why was the Workers’ Party asking questions on Middle East policy? Secondly, and rather sinisterly, was the Workers’ Party trying to stir our Malay-Muslim ground against the government? And finally, would Singapore benefit if Singaporean Muslims become alienated from the government or non-Muslim Singaporeans?

    During the question and answer session at the lecture, in a moment of complete serendipity, a member of the audience asked Mr Kausikan, “What was the political reality of being a Malay-Muslim minority in Singapore?”

    Mr Kausikan replied, “I have not the slightest idea what they experience and what they feel [as I am] not a Malay-Muslim.”[3]

    Politicians in a multiracial and multi-religious country do not have the diplomatic immunity to deflect such questions.

    It is apposite to note that nowhere in my parliamentary question did the Arab countries feature. The reason Mr Kausikan saw fit to introduce a red herring, which is not found on the parliamentary record, is best known to him. On the contrary, my parliamentary question sought to query whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would consider voting along with the majority of ASEAN members on Palestine-specific issues at the UN in future, particularly since all the ASEAN countries voted in favour of the resolution, barring Singapore.

    The Straits Times published the Ministry’s position on the aforesaid resolution on 1 Dec 2012, in a short 125-word piece, citing the upgrade in Palestine’s status at the UN as a “unilateral move” that should be seen “in the context of its efforts for full UN membership.” This position, which largely mirrored that of the US – which voted against the resolution – was a wholly incongruous one for some of my Malay-Muslim constituents, some of whom follow the Israel-Palestine issue closely. Much more closely than I had cared to assume.

    As Singapore supported a two-state solution, why was it abstaining from a vote that brought Palestine closer to that reality, they asked? A handful requested me to raise the issue in Parliament, and I duly did as it was a legitimate query in my view. It did cross my mind why Singapore would take such a position, which made it stick out like a sore thumb among its closest neighbours in a largely Malay-Muslim neighbourhood. Could such a position unnecessarily unsettle the Malay-Muslim mainstream in Southeast Asia? Was it a wise position to take? And how was it in Singapore’s interests? In fact, there was no readily apparent reason why the Singapore government chose to abstain, since it consistently supported a two-state solution with regard to the Israel-Palestine conflict, a position the government takes even today.

    The Minister of Foreign Affairs provided a lengthy, largely helpful and more detailed reply – in step with the political process in a parliamentary democracy – to say that Singapore had consistently voted in favour of Palestinian resolutions at the UN General Assembly. My point was that this consistent course of action had been lost on many Malay-Muslim Singaporeans as the diplomatic and political signature of Singapore’s decision to abstain from voting in favour of Palestine’s ascension to the UN as a non-member observer, overshadowed our earlier voting patterns on Palestinian issues at the UN.

    Even so, the ground sentiments of the Malay community on Palestine did not start to manifest themself as a result of my parliamentary question. To this end, it is helpful to consider some of the public sentiments on the Israel-Palestine issue that have been published in the Straits Times from Singaporeans of all racial and religious stripes, particularly Malay-Muslims. These go some way to answer the loaded question posed by Mr Kausikan – would Singapore benefit if Singaporean Muslims become alienated from the government or non-Muslim Singaporeans? The answer is an obvious one, but wholly irrelevant and unconnected to the point Mr Kausikan seeks to make.

    In 2005, the Ministry of Information, Communication and the Arts and MINDEF organised an exhibition titledThe Changing Face of Terrorism, which featured the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in a photo montage as a terrorist. More than one reader questioned this characterisation and whether it was fair or accurate. In 2006, in response to a piece by the deputy chief of the Israeli embassy in Singapore, a Sikh Singaporean and Young PAP member questioned why the Straits Times published an Israeli perspective on Israel’s actions in the region without offering a Palestinian position on the same matter. In 2007, the President of PERGAS (Singapore Islamic Scholars & Religious Teachers Association), in response to the Israeli ambassador’s call for a dialogue with PERGAS, politely replied that any meaningful dialogue could only take place when Israel ceases its aggression and use of force in the Gaza strip and Southern Lebanon, urging Israel to take a more reflective stance on its past actions. In 2009, a Malay Muslim wrote in to state that the bombing of civilians in Gaza was unconscionable, with another eloquently arguing why Muslim communities around the world were outraged over the death of innocent Palestinians.  In 2014, in an event organised by From Singapore to Palestine (FS2P), a group set up in 2012 to create awareness about the Palestinian situation gathered at Speakers’ Corner to show solidarity with the people of Gaza.

    Whether Mr Kausikan cares to admit, the Palestine issue is on the minds of a not insignificant number of Singaporeans. He would have to offer a compelling reason why he considers such foreign policy questions off-limits, even more so in the context of our democratic system of government – and especially since Singapore’s position as an outlier in abstaining on Palestine’s elevation was out of the ordinary from its usual approach. That the Malay-Muslim ground did not “turn against the government” or see “the alienation of the community” by non-Muslim Singaporeans as a result of my question, suggests a flaw in Mr Kausikan’s understanding of the Malay-Muslim ground in Singapore on the Palestine issue.

    In the same speech, Mr Kausikan, rather oddly, took issue with another question I asked in parliament on Palestine in 2014, which again, in his view, “could” have inflamed our Malay-Muslim ground. In arguing that the Workers’ Party’s views on foreign policy do not inspire confidence in him, a cursory check of the parliamentary record would show that the 2014 question he refers to, was actually filed by a PAP politician, who was later joined by his PAP colleague enquiring if Singapore could take a stronger stance against Israel!

    I had asked a supplementary question on the back of the question filed by the PAP MP on the dangers of self-radicalisation amongst Singaporeans as a result of the shocking images coming out of Gaza, and raising the prospect of this possibility to Israel through the Ministry’s public and private channels. In the name of consistency – which Mr Kausikan argued, in reply to separate question after his lecture, was “overrated” – the ambassador would have to concede that the filing of the question on Palestine and subsequent supplementary questions by the PAP MPs could have inflamed the Malay-Muslim ground as well. Why he chose not to make this point is best known to him.

    Mr Kausikan concluded his lecture by stating that he was not pessimistic about Singapore’s ability to cope with the complexities ahead. In so far as the Workers’ Party’s approach on foreign policy is concerned, he ought to have no difficulty in opining similarly.

    A check of the parliamentary record would show that on defence and foreign policy issues, the Workers’ Party adopts a measured approach, best appreciated by the tone of the Committee of Supply debates between members of the WP MPs and PAP Ministers. We do not hold back from asking questions on defence expenditure and other difficult issues, as seen most recently by the back and forth between the Defence Minister and Workers’ Party MP Faisal Manap on the challenging issue of halal kitchens on our warships. But we do so with the interests of Singapore and Singaporeans at the centre of our objectives, and in the context of a multi-racial society where every community has a right to have its reasoned voice heard in parliament. That has been the guiding principle of the Workers’ Party and must be so of all Singaporeans, regardless of our political affiliations.

    In the final analysis however, it takes two hands to clap on an existential issue for Singapore such as foreign policy or for it “to stop at the water’s edge” as Mr Kausikan puts it. At this year’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Committee of Supply Debates, which included contributions made by PAP and Workers’ Party MPs, Foreign Affairs Minister Vivian Balakrishnan remarked, “Mdm Chairman, I thank the Members of the House for sharing their perceptive insights yesterday. I am gratified by our unity of purpose. The friends and protagonists that we have on the international stage will not be so much listening to what I have to say, but rather to the congruence of the discussions and the debates in this House. It is important that we demonstrate unity of purpose.”

    Achieving such a unity of purpose on foreign policy in parliament is not an alien concept to the Workers’ Party. Nothing is stopping the government and ambassadors like Mr Kausikan from engaging opposition politicians with a view to achieve this unity outside parliament too.

    _____________

    [1] “Foreign Policy is no laughing matter”, The Straits Times, 8 June 2015.

    [2]  In the book, Mr Kausikan also took issue with the Secretary-General of the Workers’ Party, Mr Low Thia Khiang for asking the Minister of Foreign Affairs why Singapore had brought the Indonesian transboundary haze issue to the UN in the past, but not in 2013, on the back of the worse episode of haze to affect Singapore. To Mr Kausikan, this was “politicking”.

    [3] See video from 1.31.30 onwards: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gViA1O9L934

     

     

    Source: https://singapore2025.wordpress.com

  • Zulfikar Shariff: Duterte – Beneath Tough Talk, Is He A Potential Peacemaker?

    Zulfikar Shariff: Duterte – Beneath Tough Talk, Is He A Potential Peacemaker?

    The election of the Philippines’ President-elect Rodrigo Duterte signals an important shift in the country’s internal politics.

    A lot has been made of Mr Duterte’s tough-speaking, no-nonsense approach to crime in Davao. His two decades as mayor of Davao City in Mindanao have seen a drop in violent crime. This drop is attributed partly to his support of the “Davao Death Squad”, a vigilante group that conducts extrajudicial killings of criminals.

    In a region where violence (criminal and political) is part of the local history, Mr Duterte’s approach was widely supported. However, beyond the tough, warrior-like front, he has also cultivated another persona – as a peacemaker. And ironically, he is possibly one of the best hopes for lasting peace in the Philippines.

    RELATIONSHIP WITH JOSE MARIA SISON

    A Maoist-inspired Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) rebellion that seeks social and political reform has lasted more than 40 years and claimed about 30,000 lives.

    The CPP is supported by its military wing, the New People’s Army (NPA) while the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) is the political front.

    It seeks the removal of US influence and dismantling of traditional power structures that dominate relations between the peasantry and political elites. At its height in the 1980s, the CPP numbered more than 25,000 members. Its membership has dwindled to about 4,000, mainly from the peasant and indigenous communities.

    Negotiations between the CPP and the government have repeatedly broken down amid accusations of bad faith and insincerity. In 2013, negotiations were called off after the CPP demanded that its rebels held in detention be released. The Philippine government rejected the demand, citing difficulty in ascertaining a rebel from a criminal.

    Mr Duterte’s longstanding relationship with the CPP’s founder and ideologue, Jose Maria Sison, may provide a solution to the conflict.

    Sison, who was Mr Duterte’s lecturer at Lyceum University, has been in a self-imposed exile in the Netherlands after the Philippine government cancelled his passport while he was on a European lecture tour.

    Mr Duterte’s overtures to the CPP have been received positively by its leadership. Soon after his election, he met NDFP chief negotiator Fidel Agcaoili and committed to peace talks and amnesty for political prisoners.

    He further offered the CPP four Cabinet posts in the labour, agrarian reform, environment and social welfare departments.

    This offer does not mean the CPP would necessarily be part of the administration.

    As Sison has made clear, the offer can only be accepted once there is a negotiated truce. With Mr Duterte due to be sworn in on June 30, it is unlikely that any CPP members would be part of the Duterte administration for now.

    It, however, strengthens the hand of CPP leaders who are more inclined towards peaceful negotiations over armed rebellion.

    The rapprochement has, however, been rejected by some members of the Filipino military and political establishment.

    Former navy officer and coup plotter Senator Antonio Trillanes, and former police intelligence chief Rodolfo Mendoza have both discussed the possibility of a coup if Mr Duterte proceeds with his plans to bring the communists into his administration.

    BANGSAMORO

    The Muslims in Southern Philippines (Bangsamoro or Moro nation) have resisted Spanish and American colonisation for 300 years. Since independence, that resistance is focused on the Philippine state.

    At stake is the autonomy of Mindanao and its surrounding islands.

    In 1989, an Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao was created as part of the peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

    As mayor of Mindanao’s largest city and with family members from among the Bangsamoro, Mr Duterte’s candidacy was strongly supported by the Bangsamoro groups.

    His backing for the enactment of the Halal Ordinance in Davao City, which facilitates and regulates halal food compliance, and his support for the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) have won him favours in the restive region.

    The basic law would have resulted in the creation of a Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, granting greater autonomy for the region and a demilitarisation of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

    There are, however, other complications.

    Mr Duterte’s running mate, Senator Alan Peter Cayetano, is opposed to the basic law, saying it would lead to civil war and strengthen the MILF.

    The weakening MNLF has thus far rejected the basic law while the MILF has declared that its demilitarisation is conditional on the BBL being passed into law.

    Mr Duterte now appears to have moved away from his support for the basic law and is pushing for federalism of the Philippines. While federalism would potentially grant local autonomy to the Mindanao (among others), they would remain as just another region within the Philippine state.

    Still, the Bangsamoro appear to be hopeful of Mr Duterte’s next moves. Having worked closely with him over the years, there is optimism that he will be an honest broker and help initiate peaceful settlements.

    NAVIGATING INTERESTS

    While Mr Duterte appears to have the force of personality and longstanding relationships with leaders of the CPP and the Bangsamoro, he still needs to navigate a political system that has failed to find a solution.

    Sections of the military that have spent decades fighting the CPP and MILF appear to reject any settlement with the two groups.

    The failed negotiations over the years have also created a distrustful environment among political elites on each side.

    His challenge is not merely to negotiate a workable agreement but to convince every party to let go of the legacies of conflict and distrust. At the same time, he needs to assure the elements within the military and political elites and the rebel groups that they will remain relevant and influential.

    While his extending the olive branch to the CPP and MILF is a positive start, Mr Duterte still needs to convince his administration that lasting peace is the best hope for the country. And hope that the CPP and MILF keep to their end of the deal.


    • The writer is a final-year PhD candidate at La Trobe University, Australia (International Relations). He researches International Institutionalism with a focus on Asean.

     

    Source: www.straitstimes.com

  • Malays Are Underrepresented In Elite JCs

    Malays Are Underrepresented In Elite JCs

    Females and non-Malays are likelier to enrol in elite junior colleges (JCs), particularly those located in wealthy neighbourhoods, a study by two Singaporean researchers has found.

    Analysing data from more than 5,000 classrooms in six JCs over 40 years — from 1971 to 2010 — National University of Singapore (NUS) sociologist Vincent Chua and University of Melbourne economist Swee Eik Leong discovered persistent gender and ethnic disparities in the profiles of students who enrol into elite JCs located in neighbourhoods that have become wealthier.

    Over time, the representation of females in elite JCs increased, while that of Malays decreased. Malays were less well-represented in elite JCs than in non-elite ones, with the gap being largest in the wealthiest neighbourhood, the data showed.

    The three elite JCs (National, Anderson and Temasek) and three non-elite JCs (Catholic, Nanyang and Tampines) covered were located in neighbourhoods of high, medium and low wealth, measured by their share of landed property.

    “Overall, we find that females are more likely to enter elite schools located in wealthy neighbourhoods because these neighbourhoods tend to be more centrally located,” the researchers stated in the study, which was presented on Friday (May 27) at an international sociological conference hosted by the Centre for Family and Population Research at NUS.

    “We also find that minority Malays are less likely to enrol in elite schools located in wealthy neighbourhoods because these neighbourhoods lack the ethnic solidarity among minorities that less wealthy neighbourhoods have,” they added.

    It was the multiplication of school and neighbourhood characteristics that produced segregated patterns of enrolment, the researchers argued in the study, which is being reviewed by a journal. “Therefore the argument in popular discourse — that education is a social leveller — is not supported by these data; instead, it illustrates that education can facilitate growing inequalities,” they wrote.

    School performance indicators compiled by the Ministry of Education were used to distinguish elite schools from the non-elite ones. The study used data from the JCs’ yearbooks (documenting each school from its first graduating cohort), national censuses and statistical yearbooks.

    The study controlled for the observation that schools with more arts classes tend to have more females and schools that offer more classes in a language medium tend to draw particular ethnic groups, Dr Chua said. It also controlled for gender and race over-representations at the neighbourhood level, as well as permanent differences among JCs such as the grade requirements that affect the enrolment of gender and ethnic groups.

    Dr Chua said: “So having controlled for all of these (variables), we still find a strong neighbourhood effect. Indeed, the elite characteristic of schools interacts with neighbourhood wealth to reinforce certain patterns of educational inequality between gender and ethnic groups.”

    The study suggests that the location of the JCs mattered. “We emphasise that social and spatial characteristics work in combination to shape and influence inequality outcomes. It’s not a case of one or the other, it’s a combination,” he said.

    Both researchers said that the study exploited the unique setting of Singapore’s pre-university system, where public elite and non-elite schools are spatially well-distributed across neighbourhoods here.

    The findings suggest that policymakers could adopt a “cross-cutting” strategy by locating elite schools in less wealthy neighbourhoods and vice versa, he added.

    The research began in 2012, so it covered schools up until 2010. Dr Chua said that there could be changes due to policy shifts in education since 2010.

    All neighbourhoods here are well-resourced but inequalities exist, and the Government’s initiatives to help disadvantaged families could also help narrow ethnic inequalities, he added.

     

    Source: www.todayonline.com

  • Boy, 13, Falls To Death

    Boy, 13, Falls To Death

    A 13-YEAR-OLD boy fell from the 10th floor of a Housing Block flat in Bendemeer and died on Wednesday night.

    Secondary 2 student Muhammad Aidil Zahid was with a group of friends from a nearby secondary school, Chinese evening daily Lianhe Wanbao reported yesterday.

    They had been playing football when he and three others went up Block 24.

    He fell from the 10th floor at about 6pm and landed on a platform at the second floor.

    Police told My Paper yesterday that a “13-year-old boy was found lying motionless” and pronounced dead by paramedics.

    Aidil’s mother, who gave her name as Anna, rushed to the scene and broke down when she saw the body.

    The 34-year-old housewife said he was a carefree boy who was close to her.

    She told Wanbao that he was on probation as he had been involved in a case of theft and had to be home by 6pm. When he did not return by then, she felt that something was wrong.

    Residents said they heard boys shouting before the accident occurred.

    Madam Lin, 77, who lives on the 10th floor, said she heard agitated fighting among a group of teenagers at the stairs and one of them shouting “tolong tolong”, or help in Malay, before a loud thud was heard.

    The boy’s principal told Wanbao that the school has contacted the family to give support.

     

    Source: AsiaOne

  • Six Bangladeshis Are First In Singapore To Face Terrorism Financing Charge

    Six Bangladeshis Are First In Singapore To Face Terrorism Financing Charge

    Six radicalised Bangladeshi nationals who were detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in April this year are the first to be prosecuted under the Terrorism (Supression of Financing) Act.

    The six men – Rahman Mizanur, Mamun Leakot Ali, Miah Rubel, Zzaman Daulat, Md Jabath Kysar Haje Norul lslam Sowdagar, and Sohel Hawlader lsmail Hawlader – were charged in court on Friday (May 27), “for providing and/or collecting property for terrorist purposes”, said a police statement.

    Of the six, two – Miah Rubel and Md Jabath Kysar Haje Norul lslam Sowdagar – will also be charged for possession of property for terrorist purposes under the same Act.

    The six were part of a group of eight plotting to establish an Islamic state in Bangladesh, according to a statement by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) on May 3.

    The group – which called itself Islamic State in Bangladesh – was set up by 31-year-old S-Pass holder Rahman Mizanur in March this year.

    The rest of the group members – whose ages range from 26 to 34 – are Work Permit holders. All of them were working in the local construction and marine industries.

    Based on investigations by MHA, the group had identified several possible attack targets in Bangladesh, and possessed documents on weapons and bomb making. They also had significant amount of ISIS and Al Qaeda radical material, and planned to recruit other Bangladeshi nationals working in Singapore to grow their group.

    MHA said it had also seized funds the group had raised to buy firearms to carry out their planned terror attacks in Bangladesh.

     

    Source: ChannelNews Asia