The childcare centre teacher who was filmed grabbing a two-year-old boy then dropping him onto the floor last July was jailed three weeks on Thursday (Nov 27).
Siti Hadijah Mohamed Sin, 52, who was a teacher with My First Skool childcare centre, at Block 192, Toa Payoh Lorong 4, had heaved the boy backward onto the floor twice, causing him to suffer a fractured leg.
About 20 of her family members turned up in court and gave her a teary send-off.
Source: www.tnp.sg
Tasked to draft a replacement to the Sedition Act 1948, two members of the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) today expressed surprise and dismay over Datuk Seri Najib Razak’s shock announcement that the controversial law will stay.
Noting that the announcement was made during the on-going Umno General Assembly today, NUCC member Dr Mujahid Yusof Rawa also questioned the intent in breaking the pledge that has been made thrice publicly.
“I think this is, unfortunately, just to please the Umno delegates who are now having their yearly meeting,” the Parit Buntar MP said.
“If the intention was to please them, that is most unfortunate, because we are looking at the issue of Sedition Act from a substantive point, because standard of proof for this act is very low and does not address racial and religious incitement.”
The NUCC has been pushing for the law to be eliminated, contending that its ambit is too broad as it criminalises speech with an undefined “seditious tendency” and without need to prove intent.
Sharing his dismay was social activist Datin Paduka Marina Mahathir, who expressed surprise that the Act will not be replaced by the National Harmony Bills proposed by the NUCC.
As part of his administration’s raft of reforms, Najib had in 2012 pledged to do away with the Sedition Act and replace it with laws on national harmony. This was repeated twice more, most recently on September 5.
The NUCC was formed November 30 last year to establish a National Unity Blueprint and was tasked with, among others, to propose new legislation to replace the Sedition Act.
It later proposed three draft bills to replace the Sedition Act: The Racial, Religious and Hate Crimes bill, which outlaws hate speech; the National Harmony and Reconciliation Bill, which prohibits discrimination; and the National Harmony and Reconciliation Commission Bill, which details the functions of the commission that will inquire into complaints of discrimination.
Confusion over the drafts led to vicious attacks against the NUCC and the Bar Council that was roped in to help prepare the legislation, forcing Putrajaya to repeatedly deny that the proposals were the intended replacements for the Sedition Act.
Putrajaya later also began to convey that the repeal of the Act was not certain, hinting that it may be retained if the replacements are inferior.
At the 65th Umno General Assembly today, Najib removed all doubts when he declared that the Sedition Act 1948 will remain, after consultation with party leaders, NGOs and grassroots members.
He also announced that the Act will be strengthened with two extra provisions: One prohibiting insults against all religions, and the other prohibiting talks of Sabah and Sarawak seceding from Malaysia.
“I assumed he had thought long and hard before he said he would abolish it, and I’m hoping he gave the same amount of thought to this reversal of that decision,” Marina told Malay Mail Online.
“As with all laws, they mean nothing no matter what amendments are made if implementation is poor and prosecution is selective.”
Today, Mujahid also wondered aloud about the prime minister’s given reasons for the retention of the criticised law, pointing out that the Federal Constitution contains clear provisions protecting the Malays, Islam and the Malay rulers.
The PAS lawmaker criticised the possibility that the decision was made solely to convince Umno delegates at the convention of the party’s commitment to protect the Malay agenda.
“This is the wrong perception,” said the PAS MP. “The whole idea is, Umno is afraid of its own shadow and now they are trying to drag the whole country because they feel threatened and not the people, Islam or the Malay rulers.”
Up until the announcement today, Putrajaya has repeatedly insisted it will repeal the Sedition Act and sought to justify an accelerated use of the law against opposition politicians, activists, academics and even a journalist.
Defenders of the Sedition Act, primarily pro-establishment conservatives including former prime minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, contend that its removal will open the floodgates of attacks against the Bumiputera, Islam, and the Malay rulers in the absence of another pre-independence law that has since been repealed, the Internal Security Act.
Source: http://www.themalaymailonline.com
Marriages usually start off so nicely. Everyone cooperates-the couple, their parents, other relatives, friends. Things usually run smoothly.
But somewhere along the way, marital disputes pop up. This is of course natural, but these can escalate to dangerous levels if not dealt with correctly.
Sound Vision spoke to Shahina Siddiqui of the Islamic Social Services Association of the United States and Canada (ISSA) about tips for couples dealing with marital disputes. She pinpointed some problems and provided tips on how to deal with them.
1. Money
Couples argue over many things but money is by far one of the most frequent and serious. The solution is to discuss issues openly and consult within the family.
For instance, the issue of a wife working outside the home can become a contentious one. This should preferably be discussed before marriage. Also, if she does decide to work and the husband agrees, does she want to contribute a certain portion to household expenses or will she keep all of the money for herself (which is her right)?
One of the ways to avoid arguments about money is to simply make an easy budget which tracks expenses, income, investments, and establishes a framework for taking care of regular family necessities (see a sample budget for a family.
Also, learn how to make a budget and deal with debt. If you are a young student, keep in mind you have to pay off student loans. You should also know where to get interest-free loans and what assistance is available (for more information about Islamic money issues, check out Sound Vision’s money page.
2. In-laws
In-laws are the focus of blame and reproach when there are marital disputes. But there are ways to maintain a good relationship with them. Here are some tips:
a. Remember your spouse’s parents have known them longer and loved them longer. Never make an issue about “me or them”.
b. Let respective parties settle their own disputes. If your mother-in-law has a problem with her husband, let them deal with it. Don’t interfere
c. Don’t tell your spouse how to improve their relationship with their parents.
d. Expect some adjustment time for parents after marriage to adjust to this new relationship.
e. Remember that mothers are usually skeptical about daughter-in-laws and fathers about son-in-laws.
e. Always treat your in-laws with compassion, respect and mercy.
f. Maintain a balance between your needs and that of your in-laws.
g. Never compare your wife to your mother or your husband to your dad.
h. Do not go to your parents with your quarrels.
i. If you are supporting your parents financially inform your spouse as a matter of courtesy and clarity.
j. Do not forbid your spouse from seeing family unless you fear for their religion and safety.
k.Do not divulge secrets.
l. Make time to know your in-laws but stay out of their disputes.
m. Maintain the Adab (etiquettes) of Islam with your sister- and brother-in-laws (i.e.no hugging or kissing).
n. You are not obliged to spend every weekend with your in-laws.
o. Give grandparents easy and reasonable access to their grandchildren.
p. Be forgiving and keep your sense of humor.
q. Remember that nobody can interfere or influence your marriage unless you allow them to.
r. Invite in-laws at least once a month for a meal.
s. Visit them when you can and encourage your spouse to visit their parents and regularly check on them.
t. When parents become dependent on their children, a serious discussion with all parties present should take place. Expectations and requirements of such a living arrangement must be worked out.
3. Parenting
The tug of war that results from differing understandings of parenting are also a source of tension in marriage. One solution is to start learning about Islamic parenting before having children. If you already have kids, you can still learn. Check out Sound Vision’s parenting page. Or contact organizations like ISSA for resources.
4. Stress
Stress is an almost constant factor in most people’s lives in North America. Muslim couples are no exception. Stress from work, for example, is carried into the home.
Couples and families need to work out a coping mechanism in the family. For instance, couples can take a walk to talk about the day or go to the Masjid for at least one prayer. They can read Quran individually or together. The methods can vary, but as long as they are Halal and work, they can be used.
5. Domestic violence
This is an extremely sad reality and unless it is dealt with promptly by victims, perpetrators and/or those concerned about the two, then the family will break. Seeking help is necessary and if domestic violence is not stopped, the destructive effects will not only be harmful to the husband and wife, but to their children as well.
Family members, friends and Imams need to stop the abuse. They must intervene and work on getting help for the husband and the wife.
6. Spiritual incompatibility
This is a growing problem in North America, where Muslims from all around the world live and different understandings of Islam are present. There is a disturbing lack of tolerance amongst young Muslims, especially, who may get sucked into cult-like groups which preach a “we’re right and everyone else is wrong” mentality, whether the issue is where you put your hands in prayer or whether you decide to wear Western clothes or traditional Eastern ones.
This intolerance is being transferred to marriages, where a couple may differ on minor points of faith. Married couples must understand the difference between an Islamically acceptable difference of opinion and one that is not. They must develop a tolerance, balance and respect for their differences on that basis.
7. Sexual dysfunction
This is one of the least talked about problems, but it is one that is wreaking havoc in a number of marriages. Many couples who are marrying are not learning the Islamic perspective on sex and marriage. As a result, when they are not satisfied with their spouse, a number of them may turn to others or seek easy divorce, instead of a solution.
Couples have to understand that the marital relationship in this area, as in others, needs work and patience and cannot be the subject of whims and impatience. Knowledge, practice and if possible, the advice of a wise, compassionate scholar are two key elements in finding a solution to this problem.
8. Interfaith marriages
Islam forbids marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men. There are a number of Muslim women who have taken this step and regretted it later. Such an action, in most Muslim families, results in the woman being isolated from her family with no support. As a result, when marital disputes do arise, parental support, which is there for many Muslim couples, is not there for these women. These Muslim women may also experience guilt for disobeying Allah and hurting their parents.
In other cases, Muslim women ask non-Muslim men they want to marry to convert shortly before the marriage to appease their parents. Again this can lead to marital disputes. Two things usually happen. Either the man becomes a truly practicing Muslim and the couple is no longer compatible; or he’s bombarded with Muslims from the community wanting to invite him to Islam and he gets upset and may hate Islam.
In the case of Muslim men marrying Jewish and Christian women, the situation is different. While Islam does allow this, Muslim men marrying Jews and Christians need to remember that living in the West, if they end up divorcing, the children will almost automatically be given to the mother. Also, remember that the mother is the child’s most important school. If you want your kids to grow up as practicing Muslims, you are better off marrying a practicing Muslim woman, especially in the West, where the unIslamic cultural influences outside the home are strong enough. Inside the home, it will become even harder to maintain Islamic influences if a mother is not a practicing Muslim herself.
9. Intercultural marriages
While Islam does not forbid intercultural marriages, they can become a source of tension when Muslims, primarily the couple, but also their families, make their culture more important than Islam. If parental support is there for an intercultural marriage, things are smoother for the couple. If there is not, and if there is even hostile opposition on the part of one or both sets of parents, it could be better to not marry the person in the long run.
10. Lack of domestic skills
While girls are being encouraged to become scientists, engineers and doctors, for instance, there is little to no emphasis being placed on gaining domestic skills. It should be remembered that in Islam, while women are not forbidden from working within Islamic guidelines, and men are encouraged to help with housework, women’s primary duty is within the home as a home manager and mother. As a result of the lack of domestic skills, many married couples find themselves in messy homes, where meals lack proper nutrition and in general, there is frustration.
If a married couple is working, husbands need to pitch in more in the home and remember that their wife is a not a machine, but a human being who also needs rest after a hard day of work.
11. The modern Muslim woman meets the old-fashioned Muslim man
While young Muslim women of the West are being encouraged to be strong and confident, boys are being raised in the same way and with the same cultural expectations as their fathers. As a result, young couples face a tug of war, when the old-fashioned, young Muslim boy won’t lift a finger around the house (since he never saw his dad do this) and his young Muslim wife expects him to pitch in, as the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) did with his wives.
As well, a number of young Muslim men expect their wives not to argue with them since they never saw their mother cross their father. This is once again cultural. But what is clear is that boys and girls are being raised very differently. Parents have to be more careful to give proper training to both children. As well, parents need to intervene in cases of dispute of this nature and be fair, not favor their own child.
Source: http://muslimvillage.com
The government has issued a travel notice for Singaporeans to leave Yemen.
“Given the fluid and uncertain security situation in Yemen, Singaporeans are strongly advised to leave the country while it is still feasible,” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) said.
MFA also said, “Should the situation further deteriorate, Singaporeans may face difficulties leaving Yemen. Many airlines have already stopped flying in and out of Yemen and those still doing so might cancel their flights with little or no notice.
“Singaporeans are also strongly advised to avoid all travel to Yemen.”
Yemen was thrown into a crisis, after former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and his party walked out of the new government. He had rejected the UN Security Council sanctions against him for obstructing peace.
Singaporeans in Yemen who need consular assistance should immediately contact the MFA Duty Officer (24-hours) at: 6379 8800 / 8855 or [email protected].
Singaporeans in Yemen should also eRegister immediately at: http://eregister.mfa.gov.sg/ if they have not done so.
The current U.S. strategy to destroy the Islamic State is likely doomed to fail. In fact, it risks doing just the opposite of its intended goal: strengthening the jihadist’s appeal in Syria, Iraq, and far beyond, while leaving the door open for the Islamic State to expand into new areas.
This is in large part because the United States so far has addressed the problem of the Islamic State in isolation from other aspects of the trans-border conflict in Syria and Iraq. Unless Barack Obama’s administration takes a broader view, it will be unable to respond effectively to the deteriorating situation on the ground.
The good news is that the White House can still change course — and indeed, President Obama has reportedly requested a review of his administration’s strategy in Syria. In crafting a new way forward, the White House needs to understand three points about the Islamic State and the military landscape in which it operates.
1. Growth is essential to the Islamic State’s future, and its best opportunities are in Syria.
Demonstrating momentum is crucial to the jihadi group’s ability to win new recruits and supporters. In an atmosphere of sectarian polarization and amid deepening Sunni anger at the use of indiscriminate violence by the Syrian and Iraqi governments and their allied militias, the Islamic State’s primary asset has been its ability to rattle off a string of impressive victories. Its territorial gains project strength, which contrasts starkly with its Sunni rivals, such as the hapless Sunni political figures in Baghdad and the struggling mainstream armed opposition in Syria. Momentum on the battlefield also provides the Islamic State an alluring brand with which to cloak what is, ultimately, its familiar and unappealing product: single-party authoritarian rule, imposed by brutal force and secret police.
“Be assured, O Muslims, for your state is good and in the best condition,” Islamic State “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi said in his latest audiotape. “Its march will not stop and it will continue to expand, with Allah’s permission.”
Although its propaganda suggests otherwise, in reality the Islamic State has prioritized expansion and consolidation of power in Sunni Arab areas. Insofar as it attempts to seize ground and resources from government and Kurdish forces, it does so on the fringes of their territory or in isolated areas — such as the northern Syrian city of Kobani — that are especially vulnerable.
The Islamic State has incentive to pick such low-hanging fruit, but it has more to gain from seizing Sunni Arab areas. Each advance in these areas not only contributes to the group’s perceived momentum, but also comes at the expense of local Sunni competitors. This is crucial, because local forces have by far the best track record of beating back the organization in Sunni Arab areas of Iraq and Syria. Local Sunni tribes and insurgents routed the group — then known as the Islamic State of Iraq — with American help in 2007 and 2008, and rebel groups drove it from the city of Aleppo and much of northwestern Syria in early 2014.
If the Islamic State is able to sideline such competitors and establish a monopoly on Sunni resistance to hated government and militia forces, it will secure its existence for the foreseeable future. It has already effectively accomplished this in Iraq and now hopes to do so in Syria.
For the Islamic State, the most valuable target for expansion in Syria and Iraq would appear to be the Syrian countryside north of Aleppo. Mainstream rebel factions control the area but are overstretched as they seek to hold the Islamic State at bay near the town of Marea while simultaneously fighting to prevent the regime from encircling their forces inside Aleppo city, 15 miles to the south. Should the jihadis escalate their attack on Marea in the near future, rebel forces already struggling to slow regime progress in Aleppo will probably be unable to prevent significant Islamic State gains.At stake in the northern Aleppo countryside is the strategic border territory in the opposition’s heartland. If the Islamic State seizes the area, it would give it control over a key supply line from Turkey and a foothold from which to expand further west. For mainstream rebel forces, the combined human, logistical, and psychological toll of a loss there would be devastating.
In this context, the current U.S. approach of giving precedence to the Iraqi battlefield while delaying difficult decisions on Syria is at odds with dynamics on the ground.
2. The twin crises of the Islamic State and Syrian regime are inextricably linked.
U.S. officials publicly acknowledge that the Syrian regime’s behavior — indeed its very nature — is a primary factor fueling the jihadis’ rise and that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces continue to kill far more civilians (and rebels) than the Islamic State does. They also recognize that the role of mainstream rebels will be essential in reversing jihadi gains. Yet in practice, U.S. policy is emboldening Damascus and undermining the very rebels it is ostensibly designed to support.
The U.S.-led coalition’s strikes have enabled the regime to reallocate assets to face mainstream rebels, whose defeat remains the regime’s top priority. Since strikes against the Islamic State began, regime forces have gained ground against mainstream rebels on key fronts in Hama province and in Aleppo city; in the case of the latter, they have done so against the very same rebel groups that are confronting the Islamic State in the nearby northern countryside.
The targeting in Washington’s air campaign has further blurred the lines between U.S. and regime military strategies. Rather than maintain singular focus on hitting Islamic State targets in eastern Syria, the United States has struck al-Nusra Front, an al Qaeda affiliate whose role in combatting the regime and Islamic State has earned it credibility with the opposition’s base, west of Aleppo. On one occasion, the United States also appears to have hit Ahrar al-Sham, a Salafi group that has moderated its political platform substantially in recent months and that is broadly viewed as an authentically Syrian (albeit hard-line) component of the rebellion. Washington’s claims that these strikes targeted members of a secretive “Khorasan” cell planning attacks against the United States or Europe are unconvincing in rebel eyes — not least because Washington never publicly mentioned “Khorasan” until the week preceding the first round of strikes.
Such attacks strengthen jihadi claims that the U.S. campaign aims to quietly boost Assad while degrading a range of Islamist forces, and thus they are a significant blow to the credibility of those rebels willing to partner with the United States. For a rebel commander seeking to convince his fighters that cooperation with Washington is in the rebellion’s best interest, American strikes that ignore the Assad regime while hitting Ahrar al-Sham are extremely difficult to explain. Even assuming “Khorasan” poses a threat justifying urgent action, Washington should more carefully weigh the immediate losses jihadis suffer in strikes against the recruiting benefit they derive from rising disgust with the U.S. approach among the rebel rank and file.
Washington also faces a more concrete operational problem: How can it hope to empower moderate rebels in northern Syria if the regime continues to drive them toward the brink of defeat? The portion of the White House’s policy explicitly designed to strengthen these forces — a $500 million program to train and equip 5,000 fighters over the course of one year — will prove too little, too late to enable them to hold their ground against anticipated escalations by the Islamic State, ongoing al-Nusra Front efforts to expand control within rebel areas, and continued regime onslaughts.
3. For a “freeze” to help, it must be fundamentally different from a “cease-fire.”
U.N. special envoy Staffan de Mistura is advocating a “fighting freeze” in the pivotal battle between regime and opposition forces in Aleppo. The goal is to relieve the humanitarian disaster in the northern city and allow all groups to focus their resources on combatting the Islamic State.
De Mistura’s use of the word “freeze” rather than “cease-fire” is important. Cease-fires have been discredited in Syria: The regime has exploited them as a pillar of its strategy, cutting such agreements with rebels to cement a military victory or to withdraw resources in one area in order to shift them to another front. The regime’s significant advantage in firepower has ensured that terms are heavily tilted in its favor — and it has often used egregious violations of international humanitarian law, including sieges and indiscriminate bombardment, to achieve its aims. The cease-fires thus have not led to an overall reduction in the level of violence nationally or in the resolution of legitimate grievances that jihadi groups have proved so adept at exploiting.
A freeze in Aleppo can save lives and aid efforts to combat the Islamic State, but only if it preserves the mainstream opposition’s fighting capacity. If it cements regime victory there or enables Damascus to redeploy resources against mainstream rebels elsewhere, it will work to the Islamic State’s advantage. Insofar as the regime is able to gain ground from mainstream rebels, whether by force or truce, it is clearing Sunni competitors from the jihadis’ path.Yet the regime’s position around Aleppo is so strong, given its progress toward severing the final rebel supply line to the city, that it currently has little incentive to reach any deal that would leave the rebels’ fighting ability intact. Damascus would much prefer to deliver a decisive blow to the mainstream opposition in Aleppo, which would cripple the West’s potential partners and leave only the regime as a supposed bulwark against the jihadis. Rebels recognize this, and given their negative experience with cease-fires elsewhere, even those in favor of a freeze are unlikely to invest political capital in convincing the skeptics in their own ranks unless they see new reason to hope for a fair deal.
The crux of the American dilemma in Syria is thus clear: Degrading jihadi groups requires empowering mainstream Sunni alternatives, but doing so may prove impossible unless Damascus (or its backers in Tehran) can be convinced or compelled to dramatically shift strategy. For now, the regime treats the Western-, Arab-, and Turkish-backed opposition as the main threat to its dominance in Syria and treats the Islamic State as a secondary concern that the United States is already helping to deal with. Iran has done nothing to suggest that it objects to the regime’s strategy; instead, it is enabling it.
Damascus and Tehran appear to believe that achieving regime victory is simply a matter of maintaining the conflict’s current trajectory. This view, however, is shortsighted and would yield an unprecedented recruiting bonanza for jihadi groups. If Washington wishes to prevent this — and the unending cycle of conflict that it would perpetuate — it must better balance its Iraq and Syria strategies, refine its airstrike tactics, and find ways to change calculations in Damascus and Tehran.
Source: http://www.foreignpolicy.com